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The past few years have seen a surge of new political initiatives with the aim of combating tax evasion and tax avoidance. As a 
part of these initiatives on the level of the European Union, the Council enacted in January 2015 a new general anti-abuse 
provision to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive regulates tax benefits to cross-border distributions in 
the EU with the purpose of eliminating obstacles to formation of corporate groups across the Member State borders. The Directive 
contained previously a provision that authorized the Member States to apply their national anti-abuse provisions within the scope 
of the Directive although the application of these provisions was voluntary, and the content and scope of the national provisions 
was not regulated by the Directive. In the words of the Commission, the purpose of the change was to prevent misuse of the 
Directive and to create consistency, and these aims were to be achieved by introduction of a common anti-abuse rule in all the 
Member States. 
 
The new general anti-abuse rule in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive represents an approach without precedents in the field of 
European direct tax law since it creates a detailed anti-abuse provision with the objective of harmonizing the national anti-abuse 
rules applicable to the benefits of the Directive. Most of all, the Member States are, from now on, obliged to combat abuse within 
the scope of the Directive since the new provision has to be implemented and applied nationally. The provision raises, however, 
several questions regarding its application and its effects as a part of European tax legislation. The wording of the provision, which 
contains several conditions with the aim of defining abuse in the context of the Directive, reflects the varying formulations the ECJ 
has used in its case law on anti-abuse measures. It may appear prima facie that the provision marks a departure from the 
consistent case law and creates a new concept of abuse in the field of European tax law. The purpose of the research is to discuss 
the possible interpretations and the impact of the new provision. The different conditions of the provision are evaluated in the light 
of the ECJ case law in order to clarify their scope and meaning. The effects of the provision are discussed with respect to the 
immediate effects of its application, the effects on the Member States and their national anti-abuse rules, and the possible conflicts 
with the primary law of the EU. 
 
The ECJ direct tax case law contains a line of case law where the Court has examined abuse of tax law and the possibility to enact 
measures in order to combat abusive transactions. The concept of abuse within the field of European direct tax law has been 
developed especially in relation to such Member State anti-abuse measures which have had restrictive effects on the fundamental 
freedoms. In this case law, the ECJ has required that these anti-abuse provisions must combat only "wholly artificial 
arrangements", and the Court has developed specific tests which the national rules must respect when establishing the abusive 
nature of a transaction. This case law is discussed extensively in order to establish the possible interpretations for the new 
provision.   
 
Regarding the interpretation of the new anti-abuse provision, most questions arise in relation to the relevance of tax purposes and 
the genuine-nature of the arrangement. Given the variance in the ECJ case law, several ways to interpret the provision are 
compared in order to establish the most reasonable interpretation. In addition, the discussion reveals different points of uncertainty 
with regard to the way how the benefits of the Directive are meant to be denied and how the implementation of the provision 
affects national anti-abuse clauses and the freedom of movement. The research establishes that the new anti-abuse provision can 
be interpreted in accordance with the established ECJ case law although the wide latitudes of the provision mean that it can be 
subjected to various interpretations. The most important effects of the provision reside in its compulsory application and the impact 
on national legislation. The provision can, effectively, prevent the national legislators from adopting different solutions in its scope 
of application. The actual consequences for the companies that fall within the ambit of the provision contain several questions that 
cannot be given an unequivocal answer based on the wording of the provision alone. Most of all, the provision is set to cause 
uncertainty before its scope has been definitely scrutinized by the ECJ. 
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1 Introduction and the Research Questions 
1.1 Introduction 
Preventing tax abuse and tax evasion has been high on the political agenda of many 
governments in the past few years. The most important example of the initiatives to 
combat this phenomenon has been the BEPS-project launched by OECD and the G20-
countries which aims to develop solutions to prevent misuse of differences in national tax 
legislations.
1
 Equally in the EU, addressing these problems has received increasing 
attention, and the Commission published in 2012 an Action Plan to combat tax evasion and 
tax fraud where several initiatives to control these issues were presented.
2
 
The Action Plan proposed, among other things, the revision of direct tax directives in a 
way that mitigates the problems related to their misuse. In January 2015, the Council 
enacted the Directive 2015/121/EU amending the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Directive 
2011/96/EU hereinafter ”PSD”) which introduced a new, general anti-abuse provision 
aiming to prevent abuse of the benefits of the Directive. The former Article 1(2) of the 
PSD included only an authorization enabling the Member States to apply their domestic 
anti-abuse provisions which did not include, however, any specifications on these 
provisions. By enacting a general, common anti-abuse rule which the Member States must 
implement in their legislation, the EU tries to lessen the disparities in the Member State 
anti-abuse measures and create consistency.
3
 If the situation is found to be abusive by the 
criteria of the provision, the Member States have to deny the benefits of the Directive.  
The approach of enacting an obligatory general anti-abuse provision is new to the 
European tax law. The approach is in line with the EU recommendation on aggressive tax 
planning where a general anti-abuse rule was proposed to be taken to Member States 
legislations.
4
 Besides the anti-abuse rules in direct tax directives, the ECJ has created an 
expanding field of case law on abuse of law. In the field of tax law, this approach has taken 
various forms but, most relevantly, the ECJ has required the national anti-abuse rules to 
target only ”wholly artificial arrangements.”5  
                                                 
1
 See the BEPS 15-step Action Plan which was accepted in July 2013.  
2
 See COM(2012) 722. 
3
 See recitals 2-5 of the Directive 2015/121/EU and COM(2013) 814 p. 2-5. 
4
 See Directives 2009/133/EU Art. 15 (Merger Directive) and 2003/49/EC Art. 5 (Interest-royalty Directive). 
See also recommendation C(2012) 8806.  
5
 See e.g. C-446/03 Marks & Spencer para. 57 and C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes para. 55. 
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The new anti-abuse rule raises several questions on its application since the conditions laid 
down in the provision are relatively broadly formulated. An important issue is, therefore, 
how the provision should actually be applied and which situations fall within its scope. In 
other words, how the new PSD anti-abuse provision situates itself within the field of 
European tax law with regard to the various strains of the ECJ case law. As the PSD 
applies only to cross-border distributions, the provision may create an additional burden on 
cross-border transactions. Given the established ECJ case law on national anti-abuse 
measures, it may be questioned whether this approach is suitable and whether its leads to 
the detriment of the objectives of PSD. On the other hand, there are legitimate reasons to 
counter tax-abuse, and the effectiveness the provision should be examined in the context of 
these objectives.  
1.2 Research Questions and Limitations 
The focus of this research is the new, general anti-abuse provision of the PSD and its 
interpretation. The research aims to answer the following questions. First, how can the 
provision be interpreted in the light of the ECJ case law and the ECJ doctrine on the 
prevention of abuse within the field of taxation? Second, what are the effects of its 
inclusion in the European direct tax legislation? The effects signify legal effects not e.g. 
economical or political effects. This question is examined with respect to effects caused by 
application of the provision, its implementation, relation with the legislation of the 
Member States, and the EU primary law. By answering these questions, the purpose is to 
form an understanding of the real significance of the new provision. 
The research discusses the ECJ anti-abuse doctrine with the aim of interpreting the PSD 
anti-abuse provision. The research is limited to the assessment of tax law on the European 
level, but an exception to this is formed by the observation of national legislative solutions 
that the Member States have adopted in implementing the new anti-abuse provision. The 
research does not intend to discuss, however, more in-depth the effects of the provision on 
existing Member State anti-abuse measures, and this relation is examined only on a general 
level without considering the specifics of individual domestic anti-abuse doctrines. The 
research is limited, by the virtue of its topic, to the field of direct taxation but, given the 
development of the concept of abuse within the ECJ case law, relevant cases from other 
fields of Union law are given consideration when necessary. Furthermore, the research 
does not attempt to discuss different ways to combat the abuse of the PSD or to propose 
and evaluate approaches that could achieve this aim more effectively.  
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1.3 Research Methods 
Jurisprudence consists of different methodological currents. The methodology of this 
research is based on the methods of legal dogmatism. Legal dogmatism is a field of 
jurisprudence that concentrates on the research of legal rules currently in force. Its two 
main aims are interpretation, with the purpose of  establishing the content of legal rules, 
and systemization, with the aim of organizing the legal rules in question.
6
 This research 
strives to form through the interpretation of the new anti-abuse provision a picture of its 
place and significance within the field of European tax law. Although the implementing 
legislation of the Member States is examined, the research does not purport to resort to the 
methodology of comparative law.   
The research situates itself within the field of European tax law and, more broadly, the 
European law and international tax law. European law forms a supranational legal order 
which possesses its specific characteristics regarding the interpretation of legal rules and 
the significance legal sources. Of special importance for the research is the evaluation of 
the ECJ case law. The European law can be interpreted, inter alia, historically, literally, 
contextually, and teleologically. Especially the teleological interpretation, which signifies 
interpretation based on the purpose of the provision, has played an important role in the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ.
7
 Within the Internal Market, this interpretation means, essentially, 
an interpretation that is compatible with the objectives of the EU itself.  
Furthermore, national legislation implementing EU secondary legislation must be 
interpreted in conformance with the objectives of this legislation.
8
 This has been stated also 
with regard to the direct tax directives, and their interpretation is based, besides the 
wording, on the purpose and objectives of these directives.
9
 Of further importance is that 
the directives itself, as secondary legislation, must be interpreted according to the EU 
primary law. This technique is used to clarify the scope of the secondary legislation and to 
find an interpretation that conforms best to the primary law and avoids collisions with it.
10
 
This means that, besides the text of the new provision, also considerations related to the 
purpose of the PSD and the EU primary law must influence its interpretation. 
                                                 
6
 On legal dogmatism, see Aarnio 1989 p. 48.  
7
 On different methods of interpretation in EU law, see Äimä 1999 p. 502-504. 
8
 On consistent interpretation, see Tenore 2009 p. 28-31. See also cases C-14/83 Von Colson para. 26,  C-
80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen para. 12, and C-106/89 Marleasing para. 8. 
9
 See C-27/07 Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel para. 22 and C-247/08 Gaz de France para. 26. 
10
 On the interpretation of secondary law, see Szudoczky 2010 p. 191-193. 
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1.4 Outline of the Research 
The first part of the research concerns general questions related to European tax law 
relevant to the topic of the research. In this context, the main content of the ECJ doctrine 
on abuse of tax law is discussed as well as the relevant issues related to the freedom of 
movement. Furthermore, the PSD, its purpose, and the general features of the new anti-
abuse rule are examined in order to create foundations for further research.  
The third chapter, which contains the second part of the research, examines the questions 
related to the interpretation of the new anti-abuse provision. The research advances based 
on the conditions which can be discerned from the wording of the provision  and which are 
analyzed in the light of the ECJ case law. The objective of this section is to discuss 
possible interpretations that can be given to the new provision and the issues that these 
interpretations could create.   
The fourth chapter deals with the effects that the application of the new provision may 
have in different contexts. First, it is examined which are the consequences of the provision 
on taxpayers that come within its scope of application. Second, questions related to the 
implementation of the provision in the Member States and its effects on national anti-abuse 
provisions are discussed. Third, the provision is contrasted with the fundamental freedoms 
in order to discuss the impact the provision has on the functioning of the freedom of 
movement and how the fundamental freedoms could affect the application of the provision. 
2 European Direct Taxation, Prevention of Tax Abuse and the PSD 
2.1 Tax Sovereignty, Freedom of Movement and the Prohibition of Discrimination 
Despite the profound integration of many policy sectors, direct taxation has long remained 
within the competence of the Member States, and the EU does not have own taxation rights. 
The situation is called Member State tax sovereignty.
 11
 Since the primary law of the EU 
does not deal with direct taxation, the Member States can independently decide whether 
they are willing to collect taxes, at what rate, and in which circumstances although this tax 
sovereignty must not hinder the application of fundamental freedoms.
12
 Most visibly, tax 
sovereignty means that the EU has as many different tax systems as there are Member 
                                                 
11
 See Isenbaert 2009 p. 266-267. 
12
 On tax sovereignty, see Weber 2006 p. 586.  
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States, and the content of these systems is defined by the political decisions of the Member 
State in question which enables a Union-wide tax competition.
13
   
Even though the Member States can, consequently, decide quite freely on the composition 
of their tax systems, this does not imply that taxation would not be relevant for the Internal 
Market. Differences between the tax systems of the Member States may create barriers to 
the free movement within the Union and cause disturbances since the taxpayers have to 
conform to several tax systems.
14
 The positive integration of direct taxation has been, 
however, relatively restricted. This is related to the limits of the harmonization options. 
The lack of explicit Treaty articles requires, in conformance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, that harmonization is necessary compared to actions of the Member States. A 
further, crucial obstacle is the unanimity requirement of the Article 115 TFEU which 
functions as an efficient brake to harmonization of tax legislation.
15
Achieving unanimity in 
the Council is challenging which means that removing the obstacles caused by national tax 
systems is not generally possible through harmonization.  
On the other hand, negative integration and the case law of the ECJ have played an 
important role in the field of direct taxation. In spite of the fact that the Member States are 
free to decide the essential characteristics of their tax systems, taxation must not lead to 
restriction of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU. Although the Union does 
not have competence in the field of direct taxation, the ECJ has consistently stated that the 
national tax systems must be applied in accordance with the Union law.
16
 The TFEU 
forbids discrimination based on nationality (Article 18) and guarantees the free movement 
goods (Article 28), persons (Articles 21, 45 and 49), services (Article 56), and capital 
(Article 63) the application of which can be provoked in national courts. Union citizens 
come within the scope of the Treaty freedoms if they have exercised their freedom of 
movement which means that purely internal situations are not relevant.
17
  
The ECJ has created an extensive case law on the application of the Treaty freedoms which 
has expanded from other sectors to direct taxation. The principal ideas of this case law are 
briefly established. The Treaty freedoms as such prohibit discrimination of cross-border 
                                                 
13
 See Hrehorovska 2006 p. 158, 163. 
14
 See Terra - Wattel 2012 p. 198-199. 
15
 On the limits of harmonization, see Grau - Herrera 2003 p. 30-31. On the principle of subsidiarity, see 
Hrehorovska 2006 p. 163.  
16
 See, inter alia, C-279/93 Schumacker para. 21, C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland para. 19, C-196/04 
Cadbury Schweppes para. 40, and C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation para. 36. 
17
 See Ståhl - Persson Österman 2006 p. 66-68 on the fundamental freedoms. 
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situations when compared with domestic equivalents. Companies and individuals which 
are judged to be in a similar situation should not face less advantageous tax treatment 
because of their nationality.
18
 Both direct and indirect discrimination is prohibited.
19
 The 
residents and non-residents may be judged to be in a comparable situation which prohibits 
diverging tax treatment. 
20
 Mere disparities that are caused by the existence of several 
national tax systems are not, however, discriminatory.
21
 
In its case law, the ECJ has, nevertheless, expanded the scope of this approach to 
encompass also Member state legislation that forms ”a restriction” to the freedom of 
movement while not explicitly discriminating between foreign and domestic operators. 
Originally developed elsewhere in the Union law, this doctrine has been later brought to 
the field of direct taxation.
22
 Obstacles to the freedom of movement, although not 
discriminatory, may constitute an illegal restriction if they’re liable to prevent inter-state 
movement. Therefore, when national rules create such obstacles to cross-border situations 
which are not present in domestic ones, their application constitutes a breach of the Treaty. 
This approach is seen to have been modified or diluted in the more recent ECJ case law 
since it creates delicate problems with regard to national tax sovereignty.
23
 
As an illustration near the topic of this research, the influence of the fundamental freedoms 
on cross-border dividend taxation is given further observations. Taxation of dividends in 
the Member States comes within the scope of the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital although a ”definite influence test” has been used to distinguish 
between these two freedoms.
24
 A Member State is not allowed to subject foreign-sourced 
dividends to less favorable tax treatment than to which domestically sourced dividends are 
subjected if the situations are deemed to be comparable.
25
 For example, granting 
exemption from the income tax only in cases where the dividends are domestically-sourced 
is not in accordance with the freedom of movement.
26
 Equally, outbound dividends should 
not be taxed in the source state less favorably than domestic dividends. In Denkavit, for 
                                                 
18
 On the concept of discrimination, see Zalasinski 2009 p. 283-284. 
19
 On the definitions, see Dahlberg 2005 p. 67. 
20
 See Vanistendael 2003 p. 136-137 and C-279/93 Schumacker paras. 36-38. 
21
 See Weber 2006 p. 588-594.  See also Terra - Wattel 2012 p. 93-94. 
22
 See Zalasinski 2009 p. 285-288 and e.g. C-168/01 Bosal Holding para. 27. 
23
 See Kingston 2007 p. 1335-1341 and Terra - Wattel 2012 p. 83-92.  
24
 On the applicable freedoms, see English 2010 p. 199-201. 
25
 See English 2010 p. 201-206. Further on the case law on inbound dividend taxation, see Tenore 2010 p. 
78-81. 
26
 See case C-35/98 Verkooijen para. 36. From other cases see C-315/02 Lenz paras. 20-22 and C-319/02 
Manninen para. 55. 
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instance, a tax system which taxed cross-border dividends but exempted domestic 
dividends was deemed to be contrary to the freedom of movement.
27
 All in all, the 
fundamental freedoms have had a profound impact on the way the dividends are taxed 
within the EU. 
From this discussion, it is evident that the ECJ case law has widespread repercussions for 
direct taxation within the EU. Its main influence lies in the fact that even non-harmonized 
national legislation must conform to the Treaty freedoms and, consequently, to the ECJ 
case law. Because of these effects of the freedom of movement, there has been a need to 
develop justifications which can be revoked to justify restrictions to the freedoms. 
2.2 Rule of Reason and Abuse of Tax Law 
2.2.1 Treaty Justifications and Rule of Reason 
Although the Member States must respect the fundamental freedoms when applying their 
national tax rules, they may, in some occasions, apply those rules in a way that would 
prima facie mean a breach these freedoms. In general, the Treaty justifications have only a 
narrow relevance as justification for direct tax measures.
28
 The ECJ has, however, created 
the so called ”rule of reason” doctrine according to which even such justifications that are 
not mentioned in the Treaties can be used to justify restrictive national measures. These 
exemptions must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner in order to secure a public 
interest. In addition, the measures must be proportionate and suitable to achieve these 
objectives.
29
 There have been, however, some inconsistencies in whether only non-
discriminatory measures can be justified.
30
 In tax matters, the ECJ has been seen to have 
moved to a three-step justification where the measures must, respectively, not distinguish 
between domestic and cross-border situations, must be justified by a legitimate aim, and 
must not restrict the fundamental freedoms more than necessary.
31
 
The list of public interest justifications that have been rejected by the Court includes such 
justifications as loss of budget revenue and administrative difficulties. Justifications that 
the Court has accepted in its tax case law are, among others, effectiveness of fiscal 
                                                 
27
 See case C-170/05 Denkavit para. 41. On the case law on outbound dividends, see Tenore 2010 p. 75-78. 
From other cases see C-379/05 Amurta para. 61. 
28
 See van Thiel 2008 p. 279, where the narrow scope of Treaty justifications is mentioned as the main 
obstacle to their application in direct tax matters.  
29
 See Ståhl - Persson Österman 2006 p. 144-146. See also case C-55/94 Gebhard para. 37 for the definition 
of the conditions.  
30
 See Weber 2005 p. 163. 
31
 See Terra - Wattel 2012 p. 63-64.  
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supervision, balanced allocation of taxation powers, prevention of abuse, coherence of tax 
system and the principle of territoriality even though fiscal coherence has been applied 
only in extremely rare occasions, and fiscal supervision has found equally restricted 
application.
32
 Although several justifications are usually revoked by the Member States at 
the same time, prevention of abuse is given further attention. This justification confers the 
Member States a right to apply their national anti-abuse rules if certain conditions, 
developed in the ECJ case law, are met.  
2.2.2 Prevention of Abuse as Justification and the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights 
Before discussing prevention of abuse as a justification, certain definitions are established. 
First, tax avoidance has been seen to signify reduction of tax burden trough legal means 
which may, however, be countered by national legislation. Tax abuse has been described as 
misuse of differences in the rights of the taxpayers through artificial arrangements, and it is 
situated near tax avoidance. Tax evasion, on the contrary, means illegal means to reduce 
the tax burden through withholding of information or giving false data.
 33
  
Both within and outside the field of tax law, there has been a strain of ECJ case law where 
an independent, European principle prohibiting the abuse of rights has been developed.
34
 
The roots of this doctrine stem from the Van Binsbergen case in 1974 which has been 
followed by several cases in different fields of EU law.
35
  In direct taxation, it was stated in 
Kofoed that there is a general principle of Community law which prohibits the abuse of 
rights.
36
 In some cases, it is possible that the principle itself could be applied by the 
Member States to combat abuse.
37
 It appears that in the field of harmonized indirect tax 
law (VAT), the principle of abuse of rights may find independent relevance in authorizing 
Member States to deny tax benefits in abusive situations without needing to recourse to 
national law. In the case of the Treaty freedoms, the application of the principle is possible 
only as a justification for national measures.
38
 What is more, the application of anti-abuse 
                                                 
32
 See van Thiel 2008 p. 280-282. 
33
 On different definitions, see Zalasinski 2008 p. 158-161.  
34
 On the existence of the principle, see de la Feria 2008 p. 436-441. 
35
 See, inter alia, cases C-33/74 Van Binsbergen para. 13, C-115/78 Knoors para.  25, C-229/83 Leclerc para. 
27, C-39/86 Lair para. 43, C-367/96 Kefalas para. 20 and C-212/97 Centros paras. 24-25. Comments on the 
development see Cerioni 2010 p. 784-787. See also Schaper 2013 p. 368-370. 
36
 See C-312/05 Kofoed para. 38. 
37
 See Sørensen 2006 p. 439-440. 
38
 On different effects of the principle, see Zalasinski 2012 p. 452-453, Weber 2013 p. 262-264, and case C-
417/10 3M Italia para. 32. 
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rules in direct tax directives seems to require the existence of national provisions since 
these rules in the directives cannot have direct effect.
39
  
In the course of years, the ECJ has explored in several cases the concept of abuse and 
prevention of tax avoidance as a legitimate justification to apply national tax rules. Initially, 
however, the Court did not accept the legitimacy of this justification. In the case Avoir 
Fiscal, the lack of authorization from the Treaty prevented the application of national tax 
avoidance measures restricting the freedom of establishment.
40
 This outright rejection was 
lessened in later cases although the justification was applied in a restricted manner. In ICI, 
for instance, the ECJ did not disregard completely the possibility to apply national anti-
abuse rules even though rejecting their application in the case at hand since they did 
not, ”have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements.”41 
In the light of its later case law, it is, nevertheless, clear that the ECJ has accepted 
prevention of abuse as a justification. In the case Marks & Spencer, for example, the Court 
accepted in principle the legitimacy of Member State legislation the aim of which was 
prevention of tax avoidance by disallowing the transfer of losses from foreign subsidiaries 
although the justification was analyzed in combination with other justifications.
42
 The 
concept of ”wholly artificial arrangements” is central to the ECJ case law on anti-abuse 
measures. The concept which was present in cases such as ICI, Lankhorst-Hohorst and 
Marks & Spencer, was further refined in Cadbury Schweppes. In that case, the Court 
established, in line with its earlier case law, that national rules anti-abuse rules may be 
justified when they target the use of, ”wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality,” and which aim to circumvent national tax law through the abuse of 
Community law. If the transaction, on the contrary, reflects economic reality alongside tax 
motives, it cannot be considered to be abusive.
43
 In Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ created a 
definition of abuse for the field of European direct taxation. The concept has been repeated 
in several cases following Cadbury Schweppes.
44
 
                                                 
39
 See Cerioni 2010 p. 807-809,  Sørensen 2011 p. 29-32, and case C-321/05 Kofoed paras. 42-44. See also 
Rousselle - Liebman 2006 p. 562. 
40
 See case C-270/83 Avoir fiscal para. 25.  
41
 See case C-264/96 ICI para. 26. On the development of the justification, see van Thiel 2008 p. 285-287. 
See also cases C-175/88 Biehl paras. 15-16, C-324/00 Lankhorst -Hohorst para. 37, C-436/00 X and Y paras. 
43, 61, and C-9/02 De Laysterie du Saillant para. 50. See also Poulsen 2012 p. 205-206. 
42
 See case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer paras. 49-51.  
43
 See case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes paras. 51-56, 65. On the case, see Vanistendael 2006 p. 193-195.  
44
 See, e.g., C-105/07 Lammers & van Cleeff para. 26, C-303/07 Aberdeen para. 63, C-330/07 Jobra para. 35, 
C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome para. 89, and C-80/12 Felixstowe para. 31. 
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In order to establish whether there is abuse of Union law, the ECJ has developed a two-part 
test consisting of objective and subjective elements. The test was initially developed 
outside the field of tax law, but it is currently used also in tax matters. In Emsland-Stärke, 
the Court required that, first, the circumstances show that the objectives of the legislation 
in question were not attained despite their formal observance and, second, that there was an 
intent to obtain advantages from EU rules through artificial conditions.
 45
 This test has been 
introduces to the field of taxation both in indirect taxation (Halifax) and in direct taxation 
(Cadbury Scweppes).
46
  
In spite of this case law, which authorizes the application of national anti-abuse provisions 
in certain cases, the ECJ recognizes the legality of tax motives. Due to divergences in tax 
systems between the Member States and the absence of harmonization, the taxpayers have 
an opportunity to exploit these differences by establishing themselves in other Member 
States. Although taxation in that Member State would be more beneficial and this factor 
would play a role in the decision to establish there, the tax motives do not in itself turn the 
transaction abusive.
47
 Similar situation was accepted in cases on company law such as 
Centros and Inspire Art where companies that availed themselves of more beneficial 
company law requirements in other Member States were not deemed to be abusive.
48
 This 
is also evident from several cases within the field of direct taxation which have 
demonstrated the legality of tax motives.
49
 Nevertheless, the establishment may be 
disregarded if it is wholly artificial i.e., it fills the requirement of the ECJ case law on tax 
avoidance.
50
 
Furthermore, the national anti-abuse measures must conform to certain additional 
requirements. In Thin Cap Group Litigation, the ECJ established that national courts must 
be able to ascertain the abusive nature of the transaction based on objective elements and 
that the taxpayer must be allowed to provide evidence to rebut the assumption of abuse. If 
abuse is detected, the response must be limited, in line with the principle of proportionality, 
                                                 
45
 See Cerioni 2010 p. 787-789 and case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke paras. 52-53. 
46
 See C-255/02 Halifax paras. 74-75 and C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes para. 64. 
47
 See Vinther - Werlauff  2006 p. 384 where the legitimacy of tax motives is discussed.  
48
 See cases C-212/97 Centros para. 27 and C-167/01 Inspire Art paras. 137-138. See also de la Feria 2008 p. 
428-429 where it is considered that the ECJ narrowed this concept in Cadbury Schweppes. 
49
 See cases C-294/97 Eurowings para. 44, C-136/00 Danner para. 56, C-422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt para. 
52, and C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes para. 49.  
50
 See Vinther - Werlauff 2006 p. 384-386. 
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to the advantage gained by the abuse.
51
 In SIAT, the Court discussed also legal certainty as 
a part of the proportionality analysis.
52
 
In conclusion, the Member States have certain leeway to apply national anti-abuse 
measures if they apply only to ”wholly artificial arrangements” and conform to other 
limitations which the ECJ has established in its case law. Nevertheless, the proportionality 
and suitability of these provisions have been questioned on many occasions. On the other 
hand, the Court has allowed the Member States to apply in certain cases, where there have 
been also other justifications in addition to tax abuse and which have concerned loss border 
transfer of losses or profits, more restrictive provisions which have not targeted exclusively 
wholly artificial arrangements.
53
 The PSD provision is, of course, different in this respect 
since it is a common measure enacted by the EU and not unilaterally by a Member State 
but, given its similarities with the concepts discussed, the case law on the rule of reason 
doctrine has a great relevance for its interpretation.  
2.3 Preventing Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion in the EU 
Concomitant with the OECD BEPS-project and international political actions on tax 
avoidance, combating tax fraud and tax evasion is high also on the European political 
agenda. In 2006, the Commission presented a communication where it invited different 
parties to discuss the problem of tax fraud and a coordinated European response to the 
issue. In 2012, the Commission introduced a concrete step in this project by presenting the 
Action Plan on tax fraud and tax evasion. Furthermore, in June 2015, the Commission 
presented the Action Plan on corporate taxation and, in early 2016, a proposal for a 
Council Directive on rules against tax avoidance.
54
 
The 2012 Action Plan is divided into three sections which are: improvements to current 
instruments, new Commission initiatives, and future initiatives. Within this framework, the 
Commission presented several new actions with the aim of aiding the Member States in 
their work against tax fraud and tax evasion.
55
 Actions 14 and 15 proposed changes to the 
PSD by planning to introduce new provisions on hybrid structures and discussing the 
possibility of anti-abuse provisions in EU direct tax directives. Consequently, the Council 
                                                 
51
 On the analysis of the conditions, see Weber 2013a p. 315-316 and case C-524/04 Thin Cap Group 
Litigation paras. 81-83. See also C-28/95 Leur-Bloem para. 48. 
52
 See C-318/10 SIAT paras. 57-59. See also Hilling 2013 p. 303-304. 
53
 See Weber 2013a p. 320-322 and Hilling 2013 p. 300-301. See also cases C-446/03 Marks & Spencer para. 
51 and C-231/05 Oy AA para. 60. 
54
 See COM(2006) 254, COM(2012) 722, COM(2015) 302, and COM(2016) 26. 
55
 See Richardson 2015 p. 220-223 for comments on the plan.  
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adopted the amendments in the Directive 2014/86/EU on hybrid instruments and in the 
Directive 2015/121/EU on the general anti-abuse provision.  
2.4 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
2.4.1 General Remarks on the Directive 
The PSD was initially enacted in 1990 as the Council Directive on the common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States (Directive 90/435/EEC). The Directive has been subsequently amended in 2003 
(Directive 2003/123/EEC) and most recently in 2011 (Directive 2011/96/EU). The 
objective of the Directive is to alleviate the problems caused by double taxation within the 
Union and facilitate the operations of companies across the Member State borders. This 
aim is achieved by exempting from withholding taxes the distributions paid by a subsidiary 
to its parent company, and by eliminating the double taxation in the country of residence of 
the latter.
56
  
The application of the Directive is depended on several conditions. The Directive applies 
both to distributions between Member State subsidiaries and their Member State parents 
and to distributions between these subsidiaries and permanent establishments (PE) situated 
in different Member States. A company qualifies for the benefits of the Directive if it has 
one of company types listed in the Directive, it is tax resident in one of the Member States, 
and it is liable to pay, without the possibility of exemption, one of the taxes listed in the 
Directive. Furthermore, the benefits can be conferred only to companies or PEs that hold at 
least 10 % of the capital of the subsidiary.
57
 
Certain comments with regard to application of these conditions are necessary. First, only 
the companies listed in the annex of the Directive qualify for benefits if the Member State 
does not use an open-ended list.
58
 A company can qualify for the benefits of the Directive 
although the three conditions would be fulfilled in different Member States.
59
 The 
companies having tax residence outside the EU are not entitled to the benefits of the 
Directive. In dual residence situations with non-EU countries, the companies may qualify 
if there either is no tax treaty that limits the taxing competence of the Member State, or if 
                                                 
56
 See recitals 3-4 of the preamble to the Directive 2011/96/EU.  
57
 See Art. 1-3 of the Directive 2011/96/EU. Comments on the articles, see Helminen 2013 p. 157-165.  
58
 See case C-247/08 Gaz de France paras. 43-44. 
59
 See Tenore 2010a p. 235-236.  
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the company is a tax resident of an EU country under the tax treaty.
60
 This implies, 
effectively, that companies with a form not recognized by Member State legislation or 
which are established outside the Union are not entitled to the PSD benefits.  
If the conditions are satisfied, the Member State of the parent company (or that of the PE) 
has to either exempt the distributions received or grant a credit on the underlying taxes. 
The Member State of the subsidiary shall not levy a withholding tax on the outgoing 
distributions.
61
 Although the Member States retain more freedom in defining the taxation 
of distributions outside the scope of the Directive, even this taxation must be in 
conformance with the Treaty freedoms.
62
 This applies also to the interpretation of the 
Directive itself since it forms part of secondary legislation.
63
 
2.4.2 Objectives of the Directive 
The objectives of the PSD, which are relevant for later interpretation, are discussed further. 
First, it is stated that the objective of the Directive is to exempt distributions from 
withholding taxes in the state of the subsidiary and to eliminate double taxation in the state 
of the parent.
64
 This can be, however, considered to be the way to achieve the more 
fundamental objective of the Directive which is to improve grouping of companies by 
alleviating the tax hindrances these companies face and which may be needed to 
create, ”conditions analogous to those of an internal market.” This lessens the taxation 
differences that exist in cross-border groups when compared with corporate groups in one 
Member State and enhances the neutrality of competition, productivity, and competitive 
strength.
65
 Furthermore, the ECJ has stated in several judgments that the purpose of the 
Directive is to remove ”any disadvantage” to cross-border cooperation.66 Therefore, the 
main purpose of the PSD is to further the formation of the Internal Market, which 
correspond to the objectives of the Union as a whole, by supporting the grouping of 
companies, and this cooperation is supported by the removal of tax obstacles.
 67
 It has been 
                                                 
60
 On the significance of tax treaties on the application, see Terra - Wattel 2012 p. 607.  
61
 For the definition of withholding tax, see C-375/98 Epson para. 23, C-294/99 Athinaïki paras. 28-29, C-
58/01 Océ Van der Grinten para. 47, and C-284/06 Burda para. 52. 
62
 See cases C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation para. 54 and  C-379/05 Amurta para. 24. 
63
 On the application of other EU law on tax directives, see Englisch 2010 p. 201 and Szudoczky 2010 p. 
191-193. See also C-138/07 Cobelfret para. 55. 
64
 See recital 3 of the preamble to the Directive 2011/96/EU. 
65
 See recitals 4-6 of the Directive 2011/96/EU. See also C-48/07 Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves para. 37. 
66
 See e.g. cases C-294/99 Athinaïki para. 25,  C-446/04 FII Group Litigation para. 103, and C-284/06 Burda 
para. 51. 
67
 For the objectives of the EU, see Art. 26 TFEU and Art. 3(3) TEU. 
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interpreted from the ECJ judgment Denkavit-VITIC-Voormeer that the Directive is 
intended to foster lasting cooperation instead of short-term advantages.
68
  
Supporting the formation of company groups is based on the political will to further the 
creation of the Internal Market in a specific sector which entails that the purpose of the 
PSD is aimed at a defined group of situations. The purpose is, therefore, not to alleviate the 
tax treatment of individual companies but only the tax disadvantages of those companies 
that form a part of an international group. These activities must cross the Member State 
borders in order to have relevance in the Internal Market context. These companies have to 
be, furthermore, companies of the Member States which is a concept that is more closely 
defined in the Article 2 of the Directive.  
In addition, it is stated in the PSD that the Directive has a purpose of enacting tax rules that 
are neutral from the point of view of competition and that achieve fiscal neutrality.
69
 Fiscal 
neutrality is an economic concept that concerns the creation of tax rules that do not have 
effects on the behavior of the taxpayers which in the case of the PSD means the neutrality 
of cross-border distributions.
70
 It has been, however, considered that these efficiency 
arguments could not play a decisive role in the ECJ in the interpretation of the PSD 
although they are comparable to the aim of alleviating the tax disadvantages in general.
71
 
As a consequence, fiscal neutrality can be considered to represent the same objective as 
established above: mitigating tax hindrances for cross-border distributions.  
2.4.3 The Former General Anti-Abuse Rule in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
Before 2015, the PSD did not contain a specific, general anti-abuse provision. The Article 
1(2) of the Directive contained, however, a provision that authorized the Member States to 
apply their domestic or agreement-based anti-abuse and anti-fraud measures. This meant 
that the Member States had an option, not an obligation, to apply their national anti-abuse 
rules in cases where the benefits of the Directive were abused, but there were no specific 
limits placed on these provisions. The provision was not, apparently, subject to ECJ 
judgments which would have more clearly established its limits.
72
  
                                                 
68
 See Weber 1997 p. 26 and joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit-VITIC-Voormeer para. 
31. 
69
 See recitals 4, 6 of the preamble to the Directive 2011/96/EU. 
70
 See Brokelind 2000 p. 28-29. 
71
 Ibid. p. 30-33. 
72
 See Tavares  - Bogenschneider 2015 p. 491 where it is, however, stated that minimum economic substance 
was required under the rulings on the other direct tax directives.  
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Nevertheless, directive-based anti-abuse provisions do not allow, without national 
implementation, the Member States to deny the rights granted to the taxpayers. This is 
based on the lack of direct effect of such directive provisions that restrict private rights and 
was seen in the case Kofoed where the anti-abuse provision of the Merger Directive did not 
allow the restriction of the rights of the taxpayers when it was not included in national 
legislation although the implementation was defined broadly.
73
 The PSD authorization was, 
therefore, essentially depended on the existence of national rules. What is more, the ECJ 
found in its Denkavit-VITIC-Voormeer case that the general anti-abuse authorization 
cannot be used to combat abuse which is countered by other provisions of the Directive.
74
 
Given the lack of guidance on the scope of the provisions authorized by the PSD, opinions 
were divided on the true extent of discretion that the Member States had in enacting them. 
Some concluded that the old authorization could have been used to counter only wholly 
artificial arrangements.
75
 It was even stated that only such anti-abuse provisions that were 
supported by other provisions of the PSD could have been justified.
76
 In some older 
contributions, it was deemed that abuse could exist only in situations with a third-country 
connection.
77
 Furthermore, in Leur-Bloem, the ECJ declared that general, automatic anti-
abuse rules constituted a disproportional way to apply the anti-abuse provisions in the 
directives.
78
 Due to rule of reason requirements, the absence of specific provisions does not 
mean that the Member States would not be restricted to combat abusive situations. 
In conclusion, the scope of the anti-abuse authorization in the PSD was unclear with regard 
to question how far-reaching measures the Member States could actually enact. The new 
provision takes a step in another direction since it establishes more definite, although 
vague, criteria to determine which arrangements can be seen to constitute abuse of the PSD. 
2.4.4 Abuse of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
Abuse has been examined in the ECJ case law both with regard to circumvention of rules 
and abusive attainment of advantages attached to rules.
79
 The PSD can, such as other legal 
instruments, be misused in order to obtain its benefits improperly. A specific concern is the 
                                                 
73
 See Zalasinski 2007a p. 573-574 and case C-321/05 Kofoed paras. 42-46. 
74
 See joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit-VITIC-Voormeer para. 31 and Weber 1997 p. 
25. 
75
 See Tenore 2010a p. 233-235.  
76
 See Brokelind 2003 p. 162. See also de Broe 2008 p. 1001 where the discretion was seen to be limited. 
77
 See Knobbe-Keuk 1992 p. 489 and Rädler - Lausterer - Blumenberg 1997 p. 98. 
78
 See Zalasinski 2007 p. 315-319 for proportionality of anti-abuse provisions and case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem 
para. 48. 
79
 On this classification, see Vogenauer 2011 p. 525-530. 
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problem of ”directive-shopping” which is mentioned also by the Commission as one of the 
reasons to enact the new anti-abuse provision.
80
 In this form of abuse, those that are not 
entitled to the benefits of the Directive when receiving distributions directly, such as third-
country residents, may attempt to access these benefits through abusive constructions, but 
it is possible that a more lenient implementation of the PSD in some Member States could 
be source of such actions also in situations involving only Member States.
81
  
Directive-shopping is made possible by disparities between Member State tax systems 
since certain Member States may subject distributions to beneficial treatment such as no or 
low withholding tax. Tax treaty benefits combined with the PSD may allow the repatriation 
of distributed profits with low or inexistent tax burden.
82
 By interposing a company in a 
Member State, non-residents can gain access to these benefits although this would not be 
directly possible due to nationality requirements of the PSD. Interestingly, this problem 
was envisaged already in the early stages of application of the PSD.
83
Companies 
established according to Member State legislation are protected by the freedom of 
establishment even though their owners would reside outside the Union and, consequently, 
the Member State response is limited by the rule of reason doctrine.
84
    
For instance, a holding company can be established in an EU Member State with a 
beneficial tax treaty network. Due to the PSD benefits, the subsidiaries in other Member 
States are able to channel their profits to the holding company free of withholding taxes. 
The holding company can, on its turn, distribute its profits to a non-EU parent company 
with a low tax burden by utilizing tax treaties.
85
 Another example is the circumvention of 
participation exemption rules of a Member State through a Member State conduit 
company.
86
 In addition, there are naturally also other ways to abuse the PSD, but some of 
these situations are dealt with specific provisions of the Directive. 
2.5 General Features of the New Anti-Abuse Provision 
The Council Directive 2015/121/EU introduced a new general anti-abuse provision to the 
PSD based on the proposal in the Commission 2012 Action Plan to revise the directive-
                                                 
80
 See COM(2013) 814 p. 4-5.  
81
 For definition of directive-shopping, see de Broe 2008 p. 22-24. 
82
 Generally on the problem, see Poulsen 2013 p. 230-231 and Sørensen 2015 p. 106. 
83
 See Raby 1992 p. 221. 
84
 See Evers - de Graaf 2009 p. 279-281 and Poulsen 2013 p. 233-236. 
85
 This structure in presented in Tavares - Bogenschneider 2015 p. 486-488. Similarly Panayi 2006 p. 154-
156. 
86
 See de Broe 2008 p. 23-24. See also Weber 1996 p. 66 and Weber 2016 p. 116. 
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based anti-abuse provisions.
87
 The Member States had to implement the provision before 
the end of the year 2015. In its recommendation on aggressive tax planning, the 
Commission had already recommended that the Member States should adopt a general 
anti-abuse rule corresponding to the one presented in the recommendation.
88
 The proposed 
PSD anti-abuse provision was developed in accordance with this recommendation although 
the enacted provision differs in several aspects from the proposal of the Commission. 
The state of Union legislation contained several alleged challenges that prompted the 
Commission to propose the new provision. First, the Member State response to abusive 
situations was found to be limited by the ECJ case law, and the variance in Member State 
provisions was seen to create opportunities for directive-shopping and other forms of abuse. 
Moreover, the prevention of abusive practices was considered to be jeopardized by the fact 
that some Member States did not have any specific anti-abuse provisions in their 
legislation. The national anti-abuse provisions were deemed to lack the effectiveness of an 
EU-level response and, in the worst case, they could be seen to contribute to misuse of the 
Directive.
89
 
In order to address these concerns, the Commission proposed an obligatory anti-abuse 
provision that would prevent the misuse of the PSD and achieve uniformity on the level of 
Member State legislations. The amending provision states that: ”Member States shall not 
grant the benefits of this Directive to an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, 
having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a 
tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having 
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances.”90 Transactions are not genuine, ”to the 
extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic 
reality.” Furthermore, the Article 1(4) of the provision authorizes the Member States to 
apply their national or agreement-based provisions.  
At the first sight, several conditions can be derived from the provision. First, there must be 
an arrangement or a series of arrangements. Second, the main purpose or one of the main 
purposes of this arrangement must be the obtainment of a tax advantage. Third, this 
advantage must be contrary to the objectives of the Directive. And finally, the arrangement 
                                                 
87
 See COM(2012) 722 p. 9 action 15.  
88
 See C(2012) 8806 p. 4-5.  
89
 See SWD(2013) 474 p. 12-13. See also COM(2013) 814 and recital 4 of the Directive 2015/121/EU. 
90
 See Article 1(2) of the Directive 2015/121/EU. The Article contains also further definitions.  
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must be non-genuine which is the case when there are no valid commercial reasons that 
reflect economic reality. Further research is based on this classification.
91
 Since both the 
provision and the amending Directive lack any further notions on its application, it may be 
concluded that all the conditions must be fulfilled at the same time. This may be assumed 
from the way in which the conditions are presented in connection with each other.
92
 As a 
consequence, if the transaction in question leaves even one of the conditions unfulfilled, it 
falls outside the scope of the provision.  
Equally relevant is the way of harmonization. The provision intends to achieve minimum 
harmonization i.e., it forms the baseline which the Member States must implement, but 
they are, nevertheless, free to enact stricter provisions as long as these provisions comply 
with the primary law.
93
 Therefore, all the Member States have to take and apply the PSD 
provision as a part of their national tax legislation. This is one of the salient features of the 
provision since it implies that the Member States are obliged to deny the benefits of the 
Directive although this was earlier only an opportunity whose exercise had to comply with 
the ECJ case law.
94
 There have been, however, opinions that the anti-abuse rule leads in 
fact to total harmonization which prevents both stricter and more lenient provisions.
95
 
Before moving on to the analysis of the conditions, few remarks on directives and their 
interpretation deserve to be observed. The EU Directives do not form part of the national 
legal order and, consequently, what binds and obliges the Member States is the purpose of 
the directive. A directive needs to be implemented in the form of national legislation 
although the Member States can decide on the details of implementation.
96
  Since anti-
abuse clauses restrict the rights of the taxpayer, the application of directive-based anti-
abuse measures is precluded in absence of national legislation although even a general 
principle in national law may be sufficient.
97
 The national legislation must be interpreted in 
the light of the purpose of the directive and, more generally, in the light of the purposes of 
the EU Treaties.
98
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 This classification of conditions is made also by Debelva - Luts 2015 p. 224. 
92
 See Tavares  - Bogenschneider 2015 p. 486, Debelva - Luts 2015 p. 224 and Brokelind 2015 p. 819. 
93
 See recital 5 of the preamble to the Directive 2015/12/EU. On minimum harmonization, see Dougan 2000 
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94
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 See van den Hurk 2014 p. 494. 
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see e.g. C-14/86 Pretore di Salò paras. 19-20 and C-80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen paras. 9-10. 
98
 On consistent interpretation, see Tenore 2009 p. 27-29. 
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In this case, there is, on the one hand, the purpose of the PSD which is alleviation of 
obstacles to cross-border business in the EU and, on the other hand, the purpose of the new 
provision with the aim of preventing abusive practices by creating an exemption to the 
application of the Directive and which may lead to restriction of cross-border movement 
since the PSD applies only to these situations.
99
 These aims must be taken into account 
when the new provision is interpreted. Anti-abuse rules in direct tax directives have been 
seen, additionally, to reflect the general principle of the prohibition of abuse although the 
direct application of the principle in this case has been discarded.
100
 The national 
legislation should, however, be evaluated in the light of the provision in the Directive.
101
 
3 Interpretation of the Anti-Abuse Provision  
3.1 An Arrangement or a Series of Arrangements 
3.1.1 Which Arrangement are Caught by the Provision 
The first condition to be analyzed is the existence of an arrangement or a series of 
arrangements. It appears that this condition can limit the application of the provision in two 
situations. First, if there are some factors that restrict the scope of the arrangement to only 
certain specific situations and, second, if a certain minimum limit to the existence of an 
arrangement could be defined under which there would be no arrangement and, therefore, 
no abuse. 
The provision itself does not define the concept of arrangement or how wide its application 
should be. The Commission proposal contained, however, a substantially different 
provision than the one enacted and which included a list of different situations that could 
constitute an ”artificial arrangement” and be subject to the anti-abuse provision. The 
situations listed where: transaction, scheme, action, operation, agreement, understanding, 
promise or undertaking.
102
 The definition is comparable to the one used in the Commission 
recommendation on aggressive tax planning.
103
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Despite the fact that the list may give some ideas on the scope of the definition, the terms 
in itself are generally formulated, and no delimitation of the condition can be deducted 
from them. Nevertheless, it appears that at least the original definition was meant to be 
wide in scope since the situations cover virtually all relevant transactions conceivable.
104
 
The listing was, however, not included in the enacted provision which means that no 
further conclusions can be made on the basis of its wording. On the other hand, this may 
have been only to technical reasons since such a listing may not have any greater relevance 
in the application of the provision. 
As the provision itself does not limit the concept of arrangement, it should be examined 
whether the concept has found any separate significance in other direct tax directives or in 
the ECJ case law. Regarding the directives, the benefits may be withdrawn if one of 
principal purposes of a ”transaction” (Interest-royalty Directive) or an ”operation” (Merger 
Directive) is tax evasion, avoidance or abuse, while in the case of the latter, the operation 
finds its content in the transactions regulated by the Directive ( mergers, divisions etc.).
105
 
When it has interpreted the provision of the Merger Directive, the ECJ has not attached any 
specific significance to the concept of operation. The Court has connected the abuse 
with ”transactions not carried out in the context of normal commercial operations.”106 
Normal commercial restructurings do not fall within the scope of the anti-abuse provision 
if they do not reflect artificiality.
107
 What is, therefore, significant is not the existence of a 
transaction or an operation but the lack of its commercial validity. 
Similar conclusions may be drawn from the ECJ case law on anti-abuse measures in non-
harmonized direct taxation. In Cadbury Schweppes, the national tax measures were 
justified when they concerned wholly artificial arrangements.
108
 The case, however, 
remains silent on the concept of an arrangement itself. Equally in the later cases, where the 
Court has referred to wholly artificial arrangements, the notion has concentrated on the 
factors which can indicate the real economic motives and, consequently, the non-
artificiality of the arrangement.
109
 In conclusion, the arrangements are not considered 
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separately but only in connection with the artificiality evaluation in the context of ”wholly 
artificial arrangements.”  
Some interesting remarks can be, however, derived from the recitals of the amending 
Directive where it is stated that the provision can apply to non-genuine elements of the 
arrangement when, for example, the entity in question would be genuine but the elements 
of a distribution would not.
110
 Since the PSD applies only to distributions between 
companies, it is reasonable to conclude that a company is involved in all arrangements, but 
the arrangements can, as stated in the preamble, include also other elements. If the 
provision would be limited only to certain arrangements, such as specific transactions, this 
restriction would likely be visible in the wording. Since abuse does not limit itself to 
specific structures, it is in accordance with the purpose of the provision that the 
term ”arrangement” covers all transactions that fulfill the other conditions of the provision.  
In conclusion, since the concept of arrangement does not seem to have been limited in the 
provision itself or, on general level, in the ECJ case law, it should include all arrangements, 
whatever their closer composition, which contain abusive elements. An arrangement can 
be considered to be rather an essential prerequisite to the application of the provision since 
misuse of the Directive benefits does not happen all by itself, but this concept alone does 
not affect the threshold of finding abuse. It should be relevant only if a lower limit to the 
existence of an arrangement could be defined. This is, however, hardly necessary since in 
these cases there would not most probably be abuse either. Series of arrangements do not 
appear to conceptually differ from these conclusions since if an arrangement or a part of it 
can be found individually abusive, it is only logical that also several arrangements in a row 
can be accorded the same treatment.   
3.1.2 Part of an Arrangement 
In addition to arrangements and series of arrangements, which are in their entirety abusive, 
the provision can also apply to parts or steps of these arrangements.
111
 At the first sight, if 
the arrangement is given the interpretation discussed above, this should not imply much 
since a part or a step of an arrangement can, arguably, be defined as an arrangement itself. 
Since arrangement cannot be given a more precise definition, it encompasses also 
structures where only a certain element is individually abusive. It has been seen that this 
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means evaluation of abusive intent for the part of the arrangement separately which seems 
to be only in accordance with the provision since otherwise these parts could hardly be 
found abusive if the more widely-defined arrangement as a whole would not be.
112
 
What may be more relevant is that, according to the recital, this approach permits the 
application of the provision only to non-genuine parts of the arrangement leaving the rest 
of the arrangement intact. This refers to the principle of proportionality which limits the 
application of all legal rules beyond what can be judged to be necessary.
113
 First, the anti-
abuse rules should apply only to arrangements that can be considered to be artificial and 
not to all transactions of certain types.
114
 Furthermore, if an arrangement is found to be 
artificial, the benefits can be withdrawn only to the extent they remove the advantage 
gained by this conduct.
115
 Therefore, if a part or a step of the arrangement is found to non-
genuine, it is in line with the principle of proportionality that only those parts are subjected 
to the anti-abuse provision. Stating this in the provision does not, however, seem to bring 
anything new since these requirements have already been present in the ECJ case law on 
anti-abuse measures.
116
 
It is, however, probable that the application of the provision would also affect the rest of 
the arrangement. If, for example, a company was genuinely established but a certain 
distribution would be non-genuine, the non-application of the benefits on the distribution 
would leave also the company without these benefits. If the arrangement consists of steps 
and one of these steps is caught by the provision, it could, even without explicit application 
of the provision, affect the genuine parts of the arrangement. It can be, moreover 
questioned which taxpayers are caught by the provision, but since this issue is more related 
to the chapter on the effects of the provision, it is examined at a later stage. 
3.2 Main Purpose of Obtaining a Tax Advantage 
3.2.1 General Remarks 
The second criterion to be examined is the requirement that the arrangement has been 
enacted, ”for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage.” 
This condition refers to the subjective element of ECJ anti-abuse case law first established 
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in the agricultural case Emsland Stärke where it was required that there is, ”a subjective 
element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by 
creating artificially conditions laid down for obtaining it.”117 The test has found application 
also in others areas of EU law including taxation where it has been adopted both in direct 
taxation and in indirect taxation.
118
 The condition has been, however, subject to diverging 
interpretations and some controversy which requires that it is examined further.
119
 
The case law contains different interpretations of the threshold when tax purposes become 
abusive. For example in Halifax, it was required that the ”essential aim” of the transaction 
was the obtainment of a tax advantage.
120
 This is where the new provision goes further, 
while stating that it is possible to apply the provision when one of the main purposes is the 
obtainment of a tax advantage. The formulation may appear very broad since taxpayers 
have usually several purposes when conducting their transactions, and it is equally normal 
to take tax considerations into account.
121
 If the provision is applied according to its letter, 
it may make possible the denial of the PSD benefits in cases where tax considerations 
feature as a relevant, but not as an exclusive, reason alongside other valid commercial 
reasons.
122
  
The wording is problematic also with regard to the generally accepted principle in direct 
tax cases according to which the taxpayers have a right to choose the Member State of 
establishment based on tax-criteria.
123
 It is completely acceptable to take tax factors into 
account as long as the establishment is otherwise non-artificial i.e., it is not wholly 
artificial.
124
 The new provision seems to, however, adopt an approach where non-exclusive 
tax reasons, even in the existence of other, more important reasons, can fulfill the test and 
fall within the scope of the provision which would imply a lower standard to find abuse. 
This is also in contrast with the initial proposal where ”essential purpose” was required.125 
Furthermore, since the purpose of the PSD itself is to offer tax benefits by lessening the 
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double taxation of distributions, the recourse to the Directive implies a will to attain a tax 
advantage in the first place.
126
  
Given the apparently broad formulation of the provision, it should be examined how the it 
could be interpreted in the light of the ECJ case law. It is examined, first, how the 
subjective test has been interpreted previously and, second, whether the PSD provision can 
be situated under one of the expressions that the Court has already used.  
3.2.2 Main Purpose or One of the Main Purposes  
First, a look is given to direct tax case law on the fundamental freedoms since the PSD 
provision, while requiring subjective and objective elements, resembles the formulation of 
the anti-abuse test which the ECJ has used in this case law. The subjective element was 
explicitly mentioned in Cadbury Schweppes where it was formulated as an, ”intention to 
obtain tax advantage.” This is connected with wholly artificial arrangements which 
are, ”with a view to escaping tax normally due.”127 Tax motives are not, however, relevant 
if the transaction, ”reflects economic reality.”128 This implies that if the transaction is non-
artificial, the intention of the taxpayer to have a tax advantage does not play a further role 
in the evaluation of abuse but, on the contrary, if there is a wholly artificial arrangement, 
the reduction of tax burden must be considered as a part of this evaluation.
129
 This means 
that in order to find abuse, there must be avoidance of tax burden as well as artificiality.
130
 
A difference between the PSD provision and this formulation is, essentially, that abuse in 
the case of the PSD does not attempt to circumvent national law but to gain a certain 
advantage granted by a tax directive.  
Cadbury Schweppes has been interpreted to mean that there is no abuse although tax would 
be the principal reason for the transaction.
131
 The case included the concept of wholly 
artificial arrangements which have the sole intend of evading taxation and ”wholly” has 
been interpreted that no other reasons in addition to tax ones can exist.
132
 The more recent 
case law on wholly artificial arrangements contains an amount of lexical ambiguity in this 
matter. In Thin Cap Group Litigation and in Lammers & Van Cleeff, reference was made 
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to, ”purely artificial arrangements, the essential purpose of which is to circumvent the tax 
legislation of that Member State.”133 Furthermore, the purpose to obtain a tax advantage 
had to be the ”only purpose” in Jobra and Glaxo Wellcome and ”sole purpose” in 
Aberdeen, SIAT, and Itelcar.
134
 In yet other cases, such as K, Felixstowe, and SCA Group 
Holding, there was no specific reference to the importance of tax purposes but references 
to Cadbury Schweppes.
135
 Sole purpose was also required in Denkavit-VITIC-Voormeer on 
the former PSD anti-abuse provision although the case predates Cadbury Schweppes.
136
  
There have been, nonetheless, opinions that this ”sole purpose test”, as inferred from 
Cadbury Schweppes and from several subsequent cases, could be interpreted to be, in 
essence, close to the ”essential purpose test” present in other, especially VAT, case law 
noting the explicit reference to Halifax in Cadbury Schweppes.
137
 One argument has been 
that if genuine economic activity is required in order to establish the non-artificiality of the 
arrangement, this implies that there are also other motives in addition to tax motives.
138
 
Applying the lower essential aim-threshold would mean that transactions which are not 
solely tax motivated but represent clearly artificiality could be caught by anti-abuse 
rules.
139
 This interpretation seems to be, most of all, practical since requiring that the sole 
or unique purpose of the transaction is avoidance of taxation could imply that transactions 
where the tax motives would play a crucial, but not an exclusive, role could not be 
prevented by anti-abuse measures.
140
  
Second, the case law on the Merger Directive is examined since the anti-abuse provision in 
the Article 15 of the Directive 2009/133/EC contains language similar to the PSD in 
requiring that an operation, ”has as its principal objective or as one of its principal 
objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance.” There have been comments that the PSD 
provision should be interpreted, by virtue of this case law, to require that ”sole” or at 
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least ”predominant” purpose of the arrangement is the obtainment of a tax advantage.141 
There appears to be a slight difference in the wording since the PSD provision requires that 
the purpose is the obtainment of a tax advantage that defeats the purpose of the Directive 
while the Merger Directive requires that the purpose is tax evasion or avoidance although 
the latter situations include, inherently, the obtainment of a tax advantage.
142
 In cases Leur-
Bloem, Kofoed, Zwijnenburg and Foggia, it was first established, in accordance with the 
Directive, that the provision applies to an operation which has, ”tax evasion or avoidance 
as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives,” and this can be presumed if 
there are no valid commercial reasons.
143
 In Kofoed and Foggia, however, it was stated 
that EU legislation cannot be applied to, ”transactions carried out not in the context of 
normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining 
advantages provided for by Community law,” with references to both Halifax and Cadbury 
Schweppes.
144
 Equally in Foggia, the Court states that valid commercial reasons, ”involves 
more than the attainment of a purely fiscal advantage,” and when this is the only aim of 
transaction, valid commercial reasons are not present.
145
  
At the first sight, it appears that Kofoed and Foggia attached the label of abuse under the 
provision of the Merger Directive to transactions whose only aim is the obtainment of an 
advantage. This interpretation has been defended despite the wording of the provision.
146
 
Foggia, nevertheless, seems to refer also to another threshold while establishing that an 
operation can entail the existence of valid commercial reasons even if there were tax 
considerations if, ”those considerations are not predominant.”147  What is more, it was 
established that if the only aim of the transaction is the obtainment of a tax 
advantage, ”such a finding may constitute a presumption that the operation has tax evasion 
or avoidance as one of its principal objectives.”148 This implies that a transaction with no 
other reasons in addition to tax reasons can be presumed to have a principally abusive 
objective, but it cannot be derived from Foggia that only such transactions could be 
abusive since the Court required the predominance of tax considerations which leaves 
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room also to other purposes. The interpretation of the Merger Directive is interesting with 
regard to the PSD provision since it means that under a similarly-worded provision the tax 
saving purpose does not have to be either sole purpose or one of the main purposes for the 
transaction, but that the predominance of these purposes suffices. 
Despite comments that abuse differs in different fields of tax law, a brief look is given to 
the certain judgments of VAT case law where the essential aim threshold has been given 
further attention.
 149
 In Halifax, it was established that, ”it must also be apparent from a 
number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain 
a tax advantage,” which is not the case if, ”the economic activity carried out may have 
some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages.”150 In Part Service, on 
the other hand, it was established that there is abuse of the VAT directives if the ”principal 
aim” of the transaction is the obtainment of a tax advantage.151 The mention on the sole 
purpose test in Halifax was, according to the ECJ, only meant indicate that the threshold 
for finding abuse, when the tax avoidance was the only purpose, had already been 
surpassed, and if the principal purpose was the obtainment of a tax advantage, the other 
non-tax purposes were not relevant.
152
 This was confirmed also in subsequent cases such as 
Weald Leasing, RBS Deutschland and Tanoarch, although in the latter two there was a 
somewhat unclear mention that, ”the essential aim of the transactions concerned is solely 
to obtain that tax advantage.”153 However, in the French, Spanish, Swedish and Finnish 
versions of the judgment, this has been translated as essential aim. Somewhat 
contradictorily, the same cases referred also to sole purpose test separately which implies 
some confusion with regard to the terminology.
154
 
After discussing the case law, it must be considered if one of these formulations could 
apply to the PSD provision. First, it would appear that the concept of wholly artificial 
arrangements with the sole purpose of tax avoidance is not expressed in the provision 
although it requires, similarly to Cadbury Schweppes, that the arrangement must be ”non-
genuine”. Nevertheless, it has been considered that the main purpose test can be actually 
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reconciliated with wholly artificial arrangements if business reasons in one part of the 
arrangement do not displace the artificiality in another part.
155
 The question is whether the 
anti-abuse measures in the cases on wholly artificial arrangements differ from those in the 
secondary legislation.
156
 Essentially, does the creation of an explicitly formulated anti-
abuse provision lead to a new concept of abuse that should be regarded separately from the 
case law on the fundamental freedoms which concerns the justification of national 
measures? Wholly artificial arrangements have been seen to be justified in the case of the 
freedoms since the Member State measures could compromise the freedom of 
movement.
157
 On the other hand, it has been considered that anti-abuse rules based on the 
former anti-abuse authorization in the PSD should have fulfilled the wholly artificial 
arrangement test, but in this case the concept of abuse was not formulated more closely in 
the provision itself which brought the situation closer to Cadbury Schweppes case law.
158
 It 
has been derived from the case of the Merger Directive, which contains a specific although 
non-mandatory anti-abuse provision, that the national measures should be interpreted in the 
light of the ECJ case law on this specific anti-abuse clause when such a clause exists.
159
   
Accordingly, the conceptually closer situation of the Merger Directive could support 
another conclusion. Given the quite close formulation of this provision and the fact that 
both directives concern secondary legislation and have a similar purpose i.e., creation 
conditions similar to Internal Market by removing tax obstacles, the case law could support 
the conclusion that tax purposes must be predominant due to the fact that this was the 
content given to principal purposes in Foggia.
160
 What remains, nevertheless, uncertain is 
the significance of the reference in Kofoed and Foggia to abusive practices whose sole 
purpose is to obtain advantages, as there is a direct reference to Cadbury Schweppes.
161
 In 
some contributions, even the Merger Directive has been seen to require wholly artificial 
arrangements.
162
 In Kofoed, the ECJ referred to the principle of abuse law which the 
provision of the Merger Directive reflects, but the Court established in the same judgment 
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that the principle is not applicable within the scope of direct tax directives.
163
 What is more, 
the two anti-abuse provisions differ in wording since the PSD provision contains both 
objective and subjective tests, similarly to Cadbury Schweppes, while the Merger Directive 
requires only the objective to avoid taxation although, in some occasions, the tests have 
been considered to be similar.
164
  
On the other hand, although the VAT cases could support the principal purpose test, these 
cases have had similar references to sole purpose test in Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes, 
and it is not evident whether this case law could be given relevance within the field of 
direct taxation as there have been differing opinions on this issue.
165
 What, however, 
connects the VAT and the direct tax directives is that they both include, albeit different, 
secondary legislation. Nevertheless, even these two situations have been regarded to be 
separate in respect of the anti-abuse concepts.
166
 The case law on the Merger Directive 
implies, however, that a provision similar to the PSD provision does not necessarily have 
to be interpreted based on the sole purpose standard, and the similarity of the context could 
support adopting this interpretation also for the PSD provision.  
Nevertheless, it is open to debate how the problematic ”one of main purposes” should be 
interpreted. Such a low threshold has not been used in the direct tax case law on wholly 
artificial arrangements if one ignores a similarly-worded reference in Cadbury Schweppes 
to Member State legislation, and the test has, as discussed above, situated on essential or 
sole purpose level.
167
 In addition, the interpretation of the Merger Directive could support a 
restrictive interpretation. In Foggia, the tax reasons were not decisive as long as they were 
not predominant among the several objectives of a transaction which is a higher 
requirement than one of the principal purposes expressed in the provision.
168
  
The implementing legislation must be, in addition, interpreted in the light of the 
directive.
169
 Furthermore, the anti-abuse provision must not defeat the objectives of the 
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directive.
170
 It is, therefore, worth considering whether the interpretation of the provision 
could be restricted by the purpose of the PSD. The Directive strives to create better 
conditions for the Internal Market by granting tax advantages to cross-border distributions 
and eliminating any disadvantages between these situations and domestic ones.
171
 It is, 
consequently, evident that each time a taxpayer revokes the Directive, or rather the 
national legislation, he seeks to gain access to a tax benefit. Although the most important 
purpose for the foreign establishment would be commercial, the decision to engage in 
cross-border distributions includes with near certainty tax considerations that could 
constitute a main purpose and fall within the scope of the provision.
172
 This is hardly in 
conformance with the purpose of the Directive or the interpretation of abuse in the case 
law on the fundamental freedoms and could support a restrictive interpretation in this 
respect by reading ”one of the main purposes” more narrowly.  
In conclusion, given the similar formulation of the Merger Directive and its interpretation, 
the purpose of the PSD, and the general case law on anti-abuse measures, the PSD 
provision can be interpreted to require mainly tax-driven arrangements. Due to the 
interpretation of the Merger Directive, supported by other case law, where a lower than 
sole purpose standard has been accepted, it would appear possible to interpret the PSD 
provision in this manner. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how an arrangement where 
tax purposes would not play even a predominant role could represent such artificiality that 
would fulfill the other conditions of the provision which underlines the need to read the tax 
purpose test in conjunction with the ”non-genuine” test and objective evaluation. 173 
Nevertheless, there may persist doubt whether the formulation could be interpreted 
differently given the variance of the case law. More relevantly, the ECJ could require the 
exclusivity of tax purposes although, given the wording of the provision, this would appear 
to be a somewhat surprising interpretation. A more broad interpretation according to the 
wording of the provision may seem unlikely since such formulation has not actually been 
used anywhere in the discussed case law. All in all, although the new formulation can 
cause an amount of uncertainty, mainly tax-motivated arrangements have been seen to be 
compatible with the ECJ case law on wholly artificial arrangements.
174
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3.2.3 Further Questions Related to the Purpose Test 
It can be considered further whose aims are to be evaluated and how the purpose of the 
arrangement is established. If the intention cannot be established outright, it has to be 
derived from objective circumstances.
175
 It has been held that the subjective element 
should not be established on the basis of the taxpayer's intention but, rather, on the basis of 
objective factors that indicate the abusive intent of the transaction.
176
 Equally, it has been 
stated that the subjective intentions can be found in the artificial character of the 
transaction.
177
 The same position was introduced by the Advocate General in Halifax, 
where it was considered that abuse of Community law is found in the objective elements of 
the case which indicate, therefore, the abusive intention of the transaction and which are 
more important than the assessment of the taxpayer's intention.
178
 This distinction may not 
be, in practice, of great relevance since the tax avoidance purpose can be, arguably, derived 
in most cases from the objective circumstances without the need to investigate the 
taxpayer's  subjective intentions. In the PSD provision, relevance is attached to the purpose 
of the arrangement even though it is of course evident that an arrangement has always a 
taxpayer that initiates it. Consequently, in establishing the purposes of the arrangement, the 
importance of different purposes can be deducted from the characteristics of the 
arrangement.  
This leads to the second question on the relation between the artificiality evaluation and the 
establishment of the purpose of the arrangement. The PSD provision requires explicitly 
that the arrangement should be non-genuine. In Cadbury Schweppes, the existence of a 
wholly artificial arrangement was demonstrated by the subjective and objective elements, 
but, even in the presence of tax motives, the transaction could not be disregarded if it 
represented economic reality.
179
In other words, if the objectives of the fundamental 
freedoms are attained through a genuine establishment in the Member State, the tax 
intentions become irrelevant.
180
 On the other hand, if there are no valid commercial 
reasons for the arrangement, i.e., it is essentially tax driven, the arrangement can be seen to 
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be artificial.
181
 It has been estimated that the principal purpose test could actually be 
fulfilled only in the case of wholly artificial arrangements.
182
 Furthermore, the Advocate 
General established in Cadbury Schweppes that artificiality cannot be inferred from the 
purpose to reduce taxation.
183
 This lends itself to the conclusion that the tax purpose test of 
the PSD provision cannot in itself indicate the existence of abuse but only as a part of the 
abuse test that establishes the artificiality of the arrangement and where the predominance 
of tax purposes supports the presumption of artificiality. This is due to similarity with the 
case law on wholly artificial arrangement in the respect that genuine transactions are 
required, and their existence should rend the tax considerations unimportant.  
There have also been opinions that a subjective test is not needed in anti-abuse 
provisions.
184
 This view has been defended also by the argument that objective evidence is 
required which may make the motives of the taxpayer irrelevant.
185
 It is certainly 
somewhat artificial to debate whether the tax saving purpose is main or sole purpose since 
the precise ”level” of these purposes may be hard to ascertain, and the abusive purpose 
may be evident when the arrangement contains other artificial elements. What is more 
relevant is that it is not the taxpayer whose purposes need to be examined but that the 
purpose of the arrangement can be derived from objective circumstances. In reality, 
however, the purpose test may be so intertwined with the other elements of the provision 
that it does not stand out as a separate, clearly distinguishable test. 
3.2.4 Obtainment of a Tax Advantage 
Abuse of tax provisions requires the existence of a tax advantage, and if the conduct of the 
taxpayer has not lead to such an advantage, the legislation cannot be considered to have 
been abused.
186
 In Cadbury Schweppes, this was established when the arrangement 
was, ”with a view to escaping the tax normally due,” while in Halifax, ”the essential aim of 
the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage.”187 The application of anti-abuse 
provisions requires, therefore, a connection between the transaction and a tax advantage.
188
 
It has been, however, established by the ECJ that the mere enjoyment of tax advantages 
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arising from the differences in Member State legislations cannot be considered to be 
abusive which means that the taxpayers cannot be prevented from benefiting from these 
advantages.
189
 It should be, of course, clear that gaining access to the benefits of the PSD 
does not as such constitute abuse of the Directive if this access does not fulfill the other 
conditions of the provision. 
Articles 4-5 of the Directive 2011/96/EU require that the distributions within the scope of 
the Directive are exempted from the withholding tax in the state of source and are not 
taxed or are granted a tax credit in the state of the parent company or that of the PE. These 
advantages, entailing a lesser tax burden, form the principal benefit that can be gained from 
the application of the Directive, and it is, actually, difficult to see which other advantages 
could be gained by the abuse of the PSD. In VAT cases, it has been established that mere 
financing advantages arising from the deferral of tax payments cannot be considered to be 
abusive.
190
 This type of situation should be less relevant with regard to the PSD since the 
distributed profits should have been already taxed at the level of the company before they 
can be accorded the benefits of the Directive. 
It deserves, nevertheless, to be considered whether benefits that are external to the PSD 
could trigger the application of the provision. The provision requires the existence of a tax 
advantage contrary to the purpose of the Directive which does not set any explicit 
requirement that only the tax advantages provided by the Directive could be found abusive. 
It may be asked whether, for example, abuse of rules that concern other profit distribution 
situations could lead to application of the provision.
191
 It could be argued that since these 
tax advantages are not regulated by the Directive and do not affect its application, they 
should not either form a tax advantage relevant from the point of view of the PSD. What is 
more relevant is that with regard to the Merger Directive, which concerns the nearest 
comparable situation, the ECJ stated in Zwijnenburg that only taxes which are included in 
the Directive and which can be subject to its benefits can come within the scope of the 
anti-abuse provision.
192
  
It has been, however, concluded that also tax benefits external to the Directive could be 
relevant for the application of the anti-abuse provision in the Merger Directive. This has 
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been defended by Kofoed where the ECJ allegedly permitted the prevention of such 
advantages and by the fact that otherwise there would be an erroneous link between the tax 
motives external to the Directive and its internal motives.
193
 In Kofoed, the relevant tax 
advantage was not explicitly specified although two such advantages were distinguishable: 
one related to an exchange of shares and another related to a distribution following this 
exchange although it was the latter which could be regarded as the purpose of the 
transaction.
194
 The ECJ found that the exchange of shares was a transaction to which the 
benefits of the Directive applied, but these could be, however, withdrawn in the case of 
abuse.
195
 The question whether the advantages related to a dividend distribution after the 
transaction could be caught the anti-abuse provision was not answered explicitly.  
Nevertheless, a later case Zwijnenburg established clearly that the tax benefits could not be 
withheld when the taxpayer sought, ”to avoid the levying of a tax such as that at issue in 
the main proceedings, namely transaction tax, where that tax does not come within the 
scope of application of that directive.”196 The same view was adopted by the Advocate 
General due to the exceptional nature of the provision which could not expand its scope to 
other taxes that were not within the scope of the Directive.
197
 This is, arguably, the most 
reasonable conclusion since otherwise the anti-abuse rule in the Merger Directive would 
have an unlimited scope of application because any tax advantage, although not related to 
the benefits of the Directive and not within its scope of harmonization but connected to its 
transactions, could lead to withdrawal of these benefits. Therefore, if the somewhat unclear 
Kofoed is regarded in the light of Zwijnenburg, it appears that tax advantages which do not 
relate to the benefits of the Directive cannot lead to application of the anti-abuse provision 
in the Directive.  
These cases support a similar interpretation of the PSD provision which would imply that 
only the avoidance of those taxes that are connected with the benefits of the Directive 
could be considered to constitute a relevant tax advantage. It must be noted that in contrast 
to the Merger Directive, which regulates such transactions that can be used to avoid also 
other taxes in addition to those mentioned in the Directive, the distributions regulated by 
the PSD cannot, generally speaking, be used to attain other tax goals since the PSD 
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requires the taxation of company profits as a condition to its application.
198
 In addition, the 
provision has a stated aim to prevent abuse of the Directive with respect to taxpayers that 
come within its scope of application while authorizing the Member States to apply other 
anti-abuse rules.
199
 This implies that the main focus of the provision is clearly abuse of the 
PSD which supports, additionally, conclusions similar to Zwijnenburg. The taxes covered 
by the Directive apply, most likely, to a larger group of transactions than the one which 
comes within the scope of the PSD, but since such situations are not regulated by the 
Directive and cannot be accorded its benefits, they should not trigger the application of the 
provision. Consequently, a treaty-shopping arrangement where the benefits of a tax treaty 
are misused should not trigger the application of the provision if the abusive arrangement 
has not lead to a tax advantage which arises from the Directive.  
Last, it may be considered whether in the absence of Member State taxation of comparable 
distributions, there could still be a tax advantage. In this case, it would appear prima facie 
that the situation of the taxpayer is not any better when he avails himself of the benefits of 
the PSD since he was not subjected to any taxation in the beginning, and there is, therefore, 
no tax advantage that could be obtained abusively. There are, however, always two 
countries that can grant the benefits to a certain distribution which means that the lack of 
taxation either in the source state or in the state of the parent company should not prevent 
the arrangement from gaining abusively the benefits of the Directive in the other country. 
Nevertheless, the anti-abuse provision of the PSD qualifies the tax advantages further by 
requiring that they are obtained against the purpose of the Directive which is, of course, 
necessary, since the main purpose of the Directive is to grant these advantages. The 
analysis of this condition will follow in the next section.   
3.3 How the Purpose of the Directive is Defeated 
The requirement in the new provision that the tax advantage, ”defeats the object or purpose 
of this Directive,” reflects the objective test in the anti-abuse case law of the ECJ.200 In 
Emsland-Stärke, this was formulated as, ”a combination of objective circumstances in 
which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the 
purpose of those rules has not been achieved.”201 The test was supplanted in direct taxation 
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in Cadbury Schweppes where the conduct was evaluated in the light of the objectives of 
the freedom of establishment.
202
 In general, abuse in the EU law requires that the benefit is 
obtained in a way that is contrary to the purpose of the rule in question.
203
 The assessment 
on whether the objectives of the EU legislation have been attained or not is a task of the 
ECJ since the interpretation of the purposes of the Union legislation remains within the 
competence of the Court.
204
 Since the purpose of the PSD was already discussed, this 
section analyses how a tax advantage can be contrary to this purpose. The expressions 
object and purpose, stated in the provision, can be deemed to be synonymous.   
Before the arrangement can be considered to be against the purpose of a provision, there 
must have been formal observance of the rule. This implies that the taxpayer has complied 
with the conditions laid down in the wording of the provision.
205
 With regard to the PSD, 
this means that the taxpayer has fulfilled the requirements set down in the Directive and 
has, therefore, gained access to the tax benefits. Accordingly, there must be a company of a 
Member State which complies with the criteria set down in the Directive.  
In the next step, it must be established that, despite the fulfillment of the formal 
requirements, the purpose of the provision would be compromised if the advantage was 
granted. Occasionally, the problem in this evaluation may be that the purpose of the 
provision is contested.
206
 This would not appear to be the case with the PSD since the 
Directive states clearly the purpose of alleviating tax hindrances and supporting cross-
border establishment. Consequently, a company fulfilling the formal criteria and gaining 
access to the advantages of the PSD is the main way how the purpose of the Directive is 
attained. This is one of the aspects where the approach of the new provision has been 
questioned since the purpose of the PSD is addressed to the Member States instead of the 
taxpayers, and it emphasizes that granting the tax benefits should be generally in line with 
this purpose.
207
 On the other hand, it would appear that, given the specific conditions laid 
down in the Directive, the purpose of the PSD could be defeated if some party gained 
access to these benefits when it would not, due to wrong place of residence, company form, 
tax-free status, or lacking shareholding, be entitled to them directly. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
202
 C-255/02 Halifax para. 74 and C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes para. 64. 
203
 See Vogenauer 2011 p. 537. 
204
 See Weber 2005 p. 186 where the case-by-case nature of this analysis is underlined. 
205
 C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke para. 52 and C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes para. 64. See also Vogenauer 2011 
p. 531.  
206
 See Snell 2011 p. 225.  
207
 See Tavares - Bogenschneider 2015 p. 491.  
 37 
   
purpose could not be attained if the arrangement did not aim to improve cross-border 
grouping of companies within the Member States.
208
  
The PSD strives to improve the position of company groupings in the Member States in 
comparison with purely domestic situations. Therefore, the PSD can be considered not to 
be aimed to alleviate the taxation of non-Member State entities.
209
 If the tax advantages 
were to ultimately benefit third-country companies, it could be argued that the obtainment 
of these advantages has been contrary to the Directive's purpose. The benefits are, of 
course, always initially granted to companies of Member States, but if the objective of this 
company was to function only as a conduit for a non-Member State beneficiary, the 
distribution would not contribute, arguably, to the grouping of companies in the EU and 
the creation of the Internal Market. It has been considered that passive holding companies 
serving only the purpose of third-country residents would not attain the purposes laid down 
in the Directive.
210
 There have also been opinions that this could be, in reality, the only 
way how the tax advantages could be obtained contrary to the purpose of the PSD.
211
  
It may be, therefore, asked whether the objective test could be fulfilled in purely EU 
situations i.e., how a tax advantage in these cases could be against the purpose of the 
Directive. First, it may be considered whether a tax advantage could accrue to a company 
not entitled to it. All the Member States are obliged to grant the benefits to companies that 
fulfill the requirements, but different Member States may have enacted the Directive more 
strictly or more generously.
212
 For instance, it is possible that a company in a Member 
State could, due to lacking shareholding, exploit the lower participation exemption rules in 
other Member States in order to gain access to the PSD benefits.
213
 Elsewhere, this type of 
situations has been considered to fall within the scope of the new provision.
214
 This 
interpretation appears to be, in principle, possible although seeking access to more 
advantageous legislation in force in other Member States cannot in itself constitute 
abuse.
215
 Moreover, it has been considered that it is not relevant from the perspective of the 
Directive in which Member State the taxes are ultimately paid and how the companies 
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establish subsidiaries in other EU countries.
216
 It is equally difficult to see how the fact that 
the shareholders would enjoy more beneficial taxation in one Member State could bring 
the purpose of the distribution against the purpose of the Directive since the shareholders 
are, inherently in the case of the PSD, in different Member States. When the obtainment of 
these benefits entails, however, artificial conduct, the purpose may not be attained. 
Second, it can be examined whether the establishment of companies in other Member 
States in order to benefit from the Directive could be against the purpose of facilitating 
cross-border grouping of companies. First, it could be argued that short-term ownership of 
shares with the only purpose of gaining the benefits of the Directive could be contrary to 
this purpose, but since this type of abuse is dealt with in the Article 3(2) of the PSD, it 
should not be countered by the general anti-abuse provision.
217
 On the other hand, it could 
be considered that even low-substance arrangements with the purpose of benefiting from 
the advantages of the Directive would contribute to the grouping of companies across 
Member State borders since the absence of such an establishment would not achieve this 
purpose and would lead to taxation that the PSD tries to avoid.
218
 It appears, in general, 
that establishing companies in other Member States could only rarely if ever be against the 
purpose of facilitating cross-border groupings since these establishment actually attempt to 
improve these groupings. The possible breach of the purpose of the Directive can, 
therefore, arise mostly in situations where the ultimate shareholder would not be entitled to 
these benefits in the absence of the arrangement.  
However, it is possibly to advance the argument that granting the tax advantages would be 
in accordance with the purpose of the Directive even in the cases with a third-country link. 
The fact that a company in a Member State has shareholders outside the EU or conducts 
business only in these countries does not imply that the company would warrant less 
protection under the freedom of establishment.
219
 This view on the purpose of the PSD has 
been considered restricted also due to the fact that the free movement of capital has been 
expanded to cover also third-country situations.
220
 Consequently, it is not possible to 
regard all companies with foreign shareholding as abusive arrangements. Moreover, if the 
Member State has extended the benefits of the PSD to third-country companies, it can be 
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hard to argue that the attainment of these benefits would be contrary to the purpose of the 
Directive.  
On the other hand, since the Directive makes reference to improving the productivity and 
competitive strength of Member State companies, the purpose has been read to require 
something more than the mere obtainment of tax advantages i.e., the PSD does not only 
aim to grant tax benefits, but it aims to grant them with the purpose of creating better 
conditions for cross-border business in the Internal Market.
221
 Therefore, the purpose of 
creating real economic activity which needs to be supported instead of creating companies 
with the sole aim of gaining these tax benefits can be included in the evaluation.
222
 
Nevertheless, the Directive does not actually require that the companies concerned should 
have economic activities and it cannot be, consequently, regarded as a further condition to 
its application.
223
 The lack of economic purpose serves, however, a role in the evaluation 
of the genuineness of the arrangement.  
In conclusion, the situations where the tax relief granted to purely EU groups could defeat 
the purpose of the Directive appear to be quite scarce, but could exist if a difference in the 
Member State legislations could be exploited to obtain the benefits without a real aim to 
create a grouping of companies. More relevance may reside in the situations with a third-
country connection where there could be an incentive to utilize the benefits of the PSD for 
abusive aims. All in all, it is not enough that a conduct as such could appear to against the 
purpose of the provision but there must be, in addition, evidence of abusive practices.
224
  
3.4 Non-Genuine Transactions  
3.4.1 General Notions on the Concept 
The PSD anti-abuse provision requires that the arrangements are not genuine which is the 
case, ”to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which 
reflect economic reality.” Genuine as a word was utilized in Cadbury Schweppes with 
reference to actual use of the freedom of establishment through ”genuine economic 
activities.”225 Interestingly, a new directive proposal on countering tax avoidance practices 
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proposes a general anti-abuse rule with a wording similar to the PSD provision and where 
non-genuine is explicitly equated with wholly artificial arrangements.
226
 Valid commercial 
reasons, on the other hand, is an expression that is used in the anti-abuse provision of the 
Merger Directive.
227
 The notion economic reality has been developed in the case law on 
direct taxation where it has been contrasted with wholly artificial arrangements i.e., a 
transaction is wholly artificial if it is not based on economic reality, and this reality was 
based on establishment in line with the purpose of the provision.
228
 
The PSD provision appears prima facie to use a new formulation to define abuse which 
leads to the question whether the PSD provision aims to create a new, different standard to 
define the artificiality of the arrangement. An analysis of the case law and of the 
development of different expressions present in distinct fields of taxation is needed in 
order to develop the boundaries of the PSD anti-abuse provision.  
3.4.2 Valid Commercial Reasons  
The anti-abuse provision of the Merger Directive states that if the operation has not been 
carried out based on valid commercial reasons, ”such as the restructuring or rationalisation 
of the activities of the companies participating in the operation,” the operation can be 
presumed to have an abusive purpose.
229
 Valid commercial reasons and tax avoidance are, 
therefore, contrasted in the provision. It was discussed earlier what significance the tax 
reasons should have in establishing the abusive nature of the arrangement, and, although 
these notions are not reproduced here, the evaluation of valid commercial reasons can be 
seen to be integrally connected with this analysis since in the absence of valid commercial 
reasons, the transaction can be considered to be abusive.
230
 
The content of valid commercial reasons has been defined further in the ECJ case law. In 
Leur-Bloem and repeated in Foggia, the ECJ stated that these reasons include, ”more than 
the attainment of a purely fiscal advantage.”231 In Kofoed, the valid commercial reasons 
were not defined further, but abusive transactions were characterized as, ”carried out not in 
the context of normal commercial operations.”232 Furthermore, as established above, the 
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ECJ stated in Foggia that the existence of tax reasons does not preclude the possibility that 
the transaction could have valid commercial reasons as long as the former are not 
predominant, and if the sole reason of the transaction was the obtainment of a tax 
advantage, the valid commercial reasons would not exist.
233
 The Court went, however, 
further and established that since the tax advantage, acquisition of losses, was very 
substantial, the fact that the merger had also effects on the cost structure, which were 
deemed inherent to the transaction, could not constitute valid commercial reasons.
234
 
Although the exclusivity of fiscal reasons indicates, necessarily, the absence of commercial 
reasons, it is, however, possible to reach the same conclusion if the tax reasons are 
predominant or if the commercial reasons are only ancillary and not in proportion to the 
tax reasons. When there are relevant commercial reasons, the taxpayer can take tax 
considerations into account when structuring his transactions.
235
 There have been 
comments that, tax reasons excluded, the ECJ would actually accept any reasons as 
commercial reasons since it has stated that the Merger Directive applies to all transactions 
within its scope irrespective of their reasons.
 236
 However, this concerns, as the Court 
considers, only the eligibility of the transactions to the benefits of the Directive, and the 
reasons become relevant in the application of the anti-abuse provision. If this is applied to 
the PSD, the possible commercial reasons would not be sufficient to save the arrangement 
when its main purpose would be the obtainment of a tax advantage. 
Nevertheless, attaching relevance only to the reasons of a transaction may be an inadequate 
way to establish the abusiveness of the transaction. In the case of the Merger Directive, the 
ECJ has not separately evaluated the economic reality of the transaction. On the contrary, it 
was clearly established in Cadbury Schweppes that tax motives are not relevant if the 
transaction reflects economic reality.
237
 Furthermore, the ECJ has held that the mere fact 
that the transaction or establishment leads to tax benefits cannot justify restrictive 
actions.
238
 Given the similar wording of the PSD provision, it can be required that, in 
addition to the existence of tax reasons, the arrangement must also be artificial according 
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to objective circumstances i.e., it does not reflect economic reality.
239
 Economic reality 
signifies that the company carries out genuine economic activity in the Member State of 
establishment or that its operations are not otherwise artificial.
240
 If the criteria are 
contrasted, it can be, however, assumed that a transaction which has no valid commercial 
intent at all would also be artificial under the criteria of economic reality since in these 
cases it is probable that there is nothing else but the structure needed to attain the tax 
benefit. A transaction can be found artificial if it does not have a valid commercial purpose 
besides the tax saving purpose.
241
 The PSD provision establishes a link between the valid 
commercial reasons of the arrangement and economic reality, and it is reasonable to 
conclude that the concepts are not meant to be evaluated separately.  
What is, therefore, the impact of the expression ”valid commercial reasons” for the PSD 
provision? In the first interpretation, the valid commercial reasons can be seen only to 
emphasize the economic reality of the arrangement if it is seen in the light of formulation 
in Cadbury Schweppes which required ”actual establishment” and ”genuine economic 
activities.”242 Valid commercial reasons could be interpreted also as one expression of the 
subjective test, and they are, essentially, evaluated in this context as a counterweight to tax 
reasons.
243
 If economic reality of the arrangement has been established, there is no further 
need to consider whether there are valid commercial reasons since they have already been 
demonstrated by real economic activity. It is of course possible to envisage a situation 
where there, evidently, would be genuine commercial activity but which would not have 
any reasonable commercial purpose i.e., it would not, for instance, aim to gain profits.  
The second interpretation would be to weight valid commercial reasons against the tax 
purposes as it was done in Foggia. There economic reality was not evaluated, similarly to 
case law on wholly artificial arrangements, with regard to the substance of the arrangement 
but rather in relation to its tax purposes, and if these purposes were predominant, the 
transaction could be considered to be abusive. The obvious difference is the parallel 
between the PSD provision and the formulation of Cadbury Schweppes. This may lead to 
the conclusion that balancing the reasons of the arrangement should not alone determine 
the existence of abuse although they are part of this evaluation. As a consequence, the 
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concept ”economic reality” must be given a closer look first, regarding the elements which 
can indicate the lack thereof and, second, regarding the level of artificiality required. 
3.4.3 Economic Reality 
Before starting to evaluate the significance of the economic reality criterion, it should be 
considered whether this criterion, developed in Cadbury Schweppes, is suitable for 
dividend taxation. In this and subsequent cases on direct taxation, the economic reality was 
contrasted with wholly artificial arrangements, ”with a view to escaping the tax normally 
due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory.”244 This criterion 
may be more complicated to apply to cases of dividend taxation, such as that of the PSD, 
since they do not actually concern allocation of income but rather avoidance or 
circumvention of dividend tax.
245
 It has been proposed that these cases should require 
additional tests in addition to allocation of income in establishing the abusive nature of the 
transaction.
246
 Evaluating whether the allocation of taxes between the Member States has 
been distorted is evidently not a relevant element in the application of the anti-abuse 
provision of the PSD since the distributed profits should have already been subjected to 
taxation on the level of the company. The economic reality test can, however, be applied to 
the cases concerning avoidance of taxes on distributions if it is adapted to the specifics of 
these situations. In direct tax cases, the economic reality has been evaluated in the context 
where the transaction did not allegedly correspond to normal economic conduct.
247
 What is 
needed, therefore, is an evaluation of the content of the arrangement in the light of the 
purpose of the provision in question.
248
 In the cases of outright fraud, the provision can 
most probably be applied without this evaluation.
249
  
This entails that the relevant elements of economic reality in the context of the PSD are 
established. As a starting point can be utilized the concept in Cadbury Schweppes where it 
was required that, first, there is actual establishment and, second, genuine economic 
activity.
250
 The Court considered this with regard to physical existence of the company in 
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terms of staff and property and with reference to ”letter box” companies that do not fulfill 
these requirements.
251
 If, for example, a company in a PSD arrangement would be 
completely void of substance and activities, this approach could lead to its consideration as 
an abusive arrangement. The test contains, however,  issues with regard to abuse of the 
PSD. First, there is the question of substance regarding the establishment i.e., what is 
required so that a company can be regarded to be genuinely established in a Member State 
since the amount of substance required is tied to the characteristics of the establishment in 
question.
252
 The Commission considered in its communication on anti-abuse measures that 
since holding and financing companies may require relatively little in terms of physical 
presence, the Cadbury Schweppes substance requirement may not function as such in these 
situations.
253
 The limited amount of substance, such as office space and staff, that is 
required by these companies should not lead to an automatic conclusion that the companies 
lack economic reality if the assets are actively managed.
254
 
The problem is equally related to the required amount of economic activity. First, the ECJ 
has considered in several cases on corporate law that the parent company can actually 
conduct all its business in the Member States of its subsidiaries.
255
 What is, however, 
relevant to notice is that the PSD arrangements involve, inherently, at least two companies 
in different Member States. Consequently, there must a company whose profits are paid as 
distributions to the parent company which does not have to have own activities. These 
cases of secondary establishment require the pursuit of economic activity for an indefinite 
period in the host state.
256
 If the subsidiary does not engage in any activities other than 
passive management of assets or if the activity actually takes place in the state parent 
company in the EU or in a third country, it may be considered not to fulfill the 
requirements for secondary establishment.
257
 The same conclusion can be made if the 
subsidiary does not have sufficient physical substance or if the establishment cannot be 
deemed to be cross-border.
258
 If the activities and the establishment of the subsidiary 
cannot be, therefore, considered to be adequate for a real establishment to have occurred, 
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the arrangement could be seen not to fulfill the conditions of the economic reality test of 
the PSD provision. In the cases where the establishment entails real economic functions 
that are effected in the state of the subsidiary, this conclusion cannot be reached. It has 
been considered that the lack of economic activities by the parent company or the fact that 
the management of the subsidiaries takes actually place in a third country can be relevant 
factors in this kind of assessment.
259
 
Nevertheless, the definite amount of activity that saves the arrangement from the provision 
may be more complex to establish. Since the usage of different holding company structures 
can be regarded as a normal way of organizing international groups, the fact that such 
companies may carry few operations cannot rend them outright abusive.
260
 It was 
considered by the Advocate General in Columbus Container Services that holding and 
capital management could not be regarded to constitute purely artificial conduct when they 
are combined with actual establishment.
261
 The activity can be considered genuine even if 
it would relate to management of income or similar functions if this level of activity can be 
regarded to be sufficient in the case at hand.
262
 What can be considered as genuine 
economic activity and, as a consequence, sufficient for not to constitute a non-genuine 
arrangement cannot be, therefore, unequivocally established. Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that considering holding companies or other entities with relatively thin substance and few 
actual activities as always failing the economic reality test of the PSD would not be an 
acceptable interpretation of the PSD anti-abuse provision.
263
 The economic reality test 
requires a careful consideration of the facts of the case and an evaluation of the substance 
and the level of activity that actually is required for a certain type of situations.  
This should not, however, imply that the PSD provision could not actually be applied to 
holding companies or financing companies. What is required is that the company carries 
out activity which is sufficient to its purpose, taxation excluded, and that it does not 
represent artificiality.
264
 In some situations, the company could be considered to have its 
residence outside the Union which could lead to the denial of the benefits without a need to 
recourse to the anti-abuse provision.
265
 In most situations, caution must be exercised since 
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the interpretation of economic reality by the ECJ requiring wholly artificial arrangements 
sets, arguably, a high standard.
266
 The evident problems in evaluating abuse under the PSD 
provision in the light of genuine establishment may lead to the conclusion that also other 
elements are needed.
267
  
The concept of economic reality should, therefore, be defined further in order to establish 
the elements that are relevant for a specific situation. For example, in Thin Cap Group 
Litigation, the analysis concerned the commercial terms of the arrangement which were 
different from those between independent companies.
268
 It has been considered that such 
elements as close timing of the transactions, distribution of risks between different 
companies in a group, and the authority of the intermediate company to decide on the use 
of its income can be used to evaluate whether the arrangements concerning directive-
shopping can be found to be artificial.
269
 The fact that a company does not bear risk 
corresponding to its activities or cannot dispose of its income and pays it immediately to a 
higher group company can also serve as an indication of the lack of economic reality.
270
 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the fact that the arrangement transfers dividends to 
third-country companies with a lower tax burden than in direct payments could indicate 
abuse.
271
 In conclusion, there appears to be various factors which can be included in the 
evaluation of the economic reality of the arrangement and which can establish that the 
arrangement has not been set up for commercial purposes. The national legislators cannot, 
however, implement general and automatic provisions which would deny the benefits of 
the directive in all cases fulfilling certain, predetermined criteria.
272
  
What may be considered further is the specific situation where the holding in the company 
does not reach such levels that the shareholder could actually control the management of 
the company. The Article 3(a)i of the PSD requires a holding of more than 10 % which 
leaves room for relatively small holdings to gain access to the benefits of the Directive and 
which would be shielded by the free movement of capital.
273
 The difference between this 
freedom and the freedom of establishment has been established, on the one hand, on the 
basis of definite influence that the holding gives to the taxpayer and, on the other hand, 
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examining whether the national legislation concerns groups of companies or holdings 
giving definite influence or whether it is neutral although there is amount of ambiguity in 
this respect.
274
 These situations do not require actual establishment in a Member State, and 
the aforementioned substance criteria is less adequate to establish abuse in these situations 
which underlines the relevance of other criteria in examining the economic reality.
275
 
In conclusion, if the arrangement does not have a valid commercial foundation, its 
economic reality can be questioned.
 276
 Given the issues related to the substance test, it may 
be more relevant to evaluate the abuse in the context of the PSD with regard to other 
factors that show the non-genuine nature of the arrangement. What will these factors be is, 
ultimately, depended on the finer composition of the facts of the case. 
3.4.4 The Level of Required Artificiality  
After examining the elements of economic reality, it should be considered how high the 
level of artificiality should be in the case of the PSD provision. The provision does not use 
the expression wholly artificial arrangements which was not present in the initial proposal 
either.
277
 More crucially, the provision requires that the tax reasons should be only one of 
the main reasons for the arrangement which could, if not interpreted to require the 
predominance of tax purposes as was suggested above, imply a different standard. It 
should be, therefore, discussed whether such a conclusion could be reached. 
The EU legislature has discretion to enact measures differing from the ECJ case law 
although this intent cannot be discerned from the Commission proposal, and the measures 
should, at any rate, respect the fundamental freedoms.
278
 There are, however, several issues 
that could surface with an interpretation that departs from the wholly artificial standard. If 
the artificiality criterion would be lower, the PSD provision could interfere not only with 
artificial arrangements but also with arrangements that have relevant business reasons. It is, 
nevertheless, possible to consider whether in the case of third-country constructions this 
would be unjustified, since these companies are not actually, under any circumstances, 
entitled to the benefits of the PSD. In this case, the issue lies in the fact that the provision is 
always applied to Member States entities no matter where their parent company resides. 
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It can be, therefore, considered what a lower standard for artificiality would mean for EU 
companies. First, it could lead to situation where ”normal” holding companies, whose 
substance may be inherently low, could be considered to be non-genuine and be denied the 
benefits of the PSD. Furthermore, it could even lead to the exclusion of such companies 
that have some real and verifiable activity but in which the tax reasons would still present 
themselves as a relevant objective. This would be evidently in disaccord with the previous 
ECJ case law and could lead to serious consequences to multinational groups in the EU.  
Nevertheless, the secondary legislation including the PSD anti-abuse provision must be 
interpreted in the light of the fundamental freedoms by choosing the interpretation that best 
conforms to their purpose.
279
 This is also the way how the ECJ avoids conflicts between 
secondary and primary law.
280
 In order to prevent restrictions to the fundamental freedoms, 
the ECJ has consistently evaluated the economic reality criterion in its direct tax case law 
in connection with wholly artificial arrangements.
281
 The same interpretation has been 
established in several VAT cases.
282
 This consistent case law supports clearly the 
interpretation where the economic reality criterion is not set lower than wholly artificial 
arrangements, and it would be somewhat unexpected if the ECJ interpreted the criterion 
less strictly than it has done before.
283
 Even the Commission stated explicitly that ”normal” 
transactions should not be constrained by the provision.
284
 
The interpretation of lower artificiality could also jeopardize the purpose of the PSD since 
it could make the grouping of companies more difficult even in non-abusive situations by 
making the establishment in other Member States less attractive. Although combating tax 
abuse is a legitimate aim, it should not undermine or even render ineffective the purpose of 
alleviating the obstacles to cross-border groups within the Union. Should the required 
artificiality be lower than the level adopted so far by the ECJ, the common system of 
taxation created by the PSD could be seriously compromised since even situations other 
than pure letter-box companies could be found abusive. Ironically, this could make the 
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distributions under the PSD less secure than the distributions outside of it.
285
 Even the new 
provision echoes the ECJ case law by requiring that the application should be 
proportionate and ”serve the specific purpose” of combating non-genuine arrangements.286  
In conclusion, if the economic reality criterion is interpreted in the light of case law on the 
fundamental freedoms where it has been developed, it should, even in the absence of an 
explicit mention, require the existence of a high level of artificiality. This interpretation has 
also been seen to conform to the main purpose test which is a possible interpretation of the 
tax purpose test in the provision.
287
 It is, moreover, supported by analogy by the text of the 
new directive proposal on countering tax avoidance practices where a remarkably similarly 
worded provision requiring non-genuineness is, in its preamble, explicitly aimed 
at ”wholly artificial arrangements” which could imply that this is the interpretation actually 
intended.
288
 In addition, the economic interest is, in the case of the PSD, that of the 
Member States which does not support any wider scope for the provision. All in all, the 
ECJ would, arguably, make quite a radical change if it were to interpret the provision more 
broadly than previously. The different choice of wording is, nevertheless, regrettable given 
the fact that the Commission underlined the compatibility of the PSD provision with the 
Treaty freedoms and stated that it reflects the ECJ case law on abuse of rights.
289
 
3.5 Conclusions on the Interpretation of the PSD Anti-Abuse Rule 
In the previous chapters, the general anti-abuse provision of the PSD has been interpreted 
in the light of ECJ case law on abuse of tax law. Since the abusive situations in the ambit 
of the PSD require, necessarily, a company that gains access to the benefits of the 
Directive, the conditions on the existence of an arrangement and a tax advantage are 
fulfilled nearly automatically although the arrangement can also include other, relevant 
steps. A tax advantage is contrary to the purpose of the PSD essentially in such situations 
where a taxpayer who would not have been entitled to the benefits directly gains access to 
them through a non-genuine arrangement. 
More questions relate to the tests on subjective purpose and economic reality. Since 
artificiality is expressly required, a mere tax saving purpose cannot turn the arrangement 
abusive. The new language of the PSD provision creates,  however, suspicions whether it 
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should be applied differently from the established ECJ case law. The tax purpose test can 
be regarded, in light of the Merger Directive and other case law, to require predominance 
of tax purposes which has been proposed also as an interpretation for the wholly artificial 
arrangements although certain doubt may persist whether the exclusivity of tax purposes 
could still be required.
290
 The formulation of the economic reality test may leave 
uncertainty whether the provision actually sets the Member a more widespread obligation 
to combat abuse in comparison with the previous case law.
291
 The possible issues raised by 
this approach can be circumvented by an interpretation that conforms both to the primary 
law and to the purpose of the PSD since, at the last stage, the ECJ selects the interpretation 
which fulfills best the aims of the Union, and the vague wording of the provision does not 
preclude the opportunity to reach this interpretation.
292
  
It can be, however, asked whether the effectiveness of the PSD would require a broader 
concept of abuse. First, it seems that the main reasons to enact the new provision were the 
variance of anti-abuse practices in different Member States and the lack of clarity for the 
taxpayers which were to be remedied by a common, minimum standard.
293
 Effective 
application of the provision appears to require its application in all Member States and the 
prevention of abuse. The purpose of the PSD is mainly compromised if the benefits accrue 
to such companies that are not entitled to them. The anti-abuse provision creates, however, 
additional burden to EU companies and, therefore, restricts the effectiveness of the 
Directive. As a consequence, the purpose of the PSD should rather require the exclusion of 
such situations only that are clearly not entitled to its benefits so that the common tax 
system is not rendered void. 
In conclusion, the provision can be interpreted to require mainly tax-driven arrangements 
as well as a high level of artificiality in the light of wholly artificial arrangements, and, if 
this interpretation is adopted, the provision should not create more severe issues in this 
respect. It may be, nevertheless, questioned whether this way of vague legislating has been 
necessary since the Member States have already had the opportunity to combat abusive 
arrangements within the boundaries of ECJ case. A more restricted provision could have 
targeted the situations that were deemed to be most harmful without creating the 
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uncertainty the new provision creates. The more important consequences caused by the 
enactment of the provision may actually reside in the other effects of its implementation. 
4 Effects of the Provision as a Part of European Direct Tax Legislation 
4.1 How the Provision is Applied 
4.1.1 What Benefits are Denied and How Double Taxation is Relieved? 
First issue to be examined is which benefits the Member States have to deny when 
applying the anti-abuse provision. The PSD provision requires that, if the conditions for 
the application of the provision are fulfilled, the Member States, ”shall not grant the 
benefits of this Directive.” Here the relevant benefits are the same that can constitute a tax 
advantage capable of being abused i.e., on the one hand, the Article 4 exemption or credit 
in the state of the parent company or that of the PE and, on the other, the Article 5 
exemption from withholding tax in the state of the subsidiary.
294
 In addition to their initial 
denial, it can be assumed that the benefits can be withdrawn also later if the arrangement is 
characterized as abusive at this stage. 
As the provision does not specify which of the benefits need to be withdrawn, it is possible 
that the Member States should, in the case of abuse, deny both of the mentioned benefits. It 
has been, however, considered to be disproportionate if both of the benefits were denied at 
the same time.
295
 Furthermore, the Commission considered it its statement to the political 
agreement on the enactment of the anti-abuse provision that the new provision should not 
affect national participation exemption systems.
296
 In spite of this statement, which does 
not manifest itself in the amending Directive, the provision has been regarded to be 
applicable to both of the benefits.
297
 This is a reasonable conclusion since otherwise one 
would expect to find an explicit limit to the application of the provision. The question is, 
rather, whether the provision requires the simultaneous denial of the benefits.  
The plural form of the expression ”benefits” could support the view that both of the 
mentioned benefits should be denied at the same time, and there is nothing in the provision 
that would expressly prevent this conclusion. The conclusion may be supported, 
furthermore, since the Commission stated in its memorandum on the PSD that the 
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provision could lead to the denial of benefits ”including” the withholding tax although not 
specifying the benefits in question.
298
 As both benefits are, without doubt, benefits granted 
by the PSD, it could appear inconsistent if one or another was maintained in the case of 
abuse. Since there are no precedents to this end in the case law on harmonized direct 
taxation, the question cannot be given a definite answer although there have been also 
other opinions that both of the benefits should be denied simultaneously.
299
  
If the provision is seen to require the simultaneous withdrawal of both of the benefits 
granted by the Directive, which involves necessarily two Member States, different 
interpretations can lead to problematic situations. For example, the source state could 
conclude that the arrangement is abusive and levy withholding taxes while the state of the 
parent company could regard the situations as non-abusive which leads to question how the 
tax levied in the other country should be taken into account. Interestingly, the Advocate 
General concluded in Thin Cap Group Litigation, although in different context, that the 
Member State applying the anti-abuse provision should ensure, via double tax convention, 
that the other state would make a corresponding adjustment.
300
 Although all of the Member 
States should be assumed to reach similar conclusions in the harmonized system of the 
provision, it is easy to foresee that situations comparable to the aforementioned case will 
surface and which will require, ultimately, the interpretation of the ECJ.
301
 The principle of 
loyalty, discussed more below, could also influence the discretion of the Member States 
especially in the cases where the abusive nature of the arrangement seems obvious.
302
 
What is, furthermore, not considered in the provision is how the Member States should 
address these distributions, and this is probably left to the discretion of the Member States. 
Nevertheless, there does not appear to stem any actual obligation to tax the distributions 
which would be the case, for example, when the Member State in question would not 
usually levy withholding taxes on outgoing distributions. As a consequence, even if the 
arrangement was regarded to be abusive, the actual effects of the provision depend on the 
domestic tax law of the Member State in question. It may be asked, in addition, whether 
the loss of benefits only leads to non-application of further exemptions or whether it 
requires the repayment of already exempted taxes. It has been concluded that when 
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monetary benefits are abused, requiring the repayment of exempted taxes even with 
retroactive effect could be allowed.
303
 In Halifax, the Member States were given certain 
leeway to determine the collection of taxes in such situations within the boundaries of ECJ 
case law which could lead to repayment of taxes from several years if this case were to 
apply to direct taxation.
304
  
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of benefits can lead to double taxation of distributions which 
the PSD explicitly strives to avoid. Without the double taxation relief of the Directive, the 
distributions can be, at least prima facie, subjected to withholding taxes in the source state 
and to further taxation in the state of the parent company. If this concerns e.g. third-country 
companies that would not be actually entitled to the benefits, the double taxation may not 
be that problematic from the perspective of the Directive. The withdrawal of the PSD 
benefits concerns, however, always companies in the EU. The proportionality of this 
approach has been questioned since the shareholders may face  cumulative taxation both in 
the source state and in the state of residence.
305
 The problem is exacerbated more if both of 
the benefits were to be denied simultaneously. 
The consequences depend on whether the Member States have to alleviate the double 
taxation of such distributions that do not come within the scope of the PSD or which have 
been withdrawn its benefits. In the scope of the corporate tax directives, the Member States 
cannot relieve the double taxation less advantageously than required by the directives.
306
In 
other situations, there have been several cases where the ECJ has concluded that parallel, 
non-discriminatory exercise of taxing powers does not require that the Member States 
should remove double taxation arising from this exercise.
307
 In Haribo-Salinen and 
Kerckhaert-Morres, the state of residence of the taxpayer was not obliged to grant credit 
for the withholding taxes levied in the state of source.
308
  
This does not, however, mean that the Member States could treat distributions that do not 
come within the ambit of the PSD in a way that contravenes the fundamental freedoms.
309
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If the dividends paid to a company within the same Member State are either exempted or 
otherwise subjected to preferable treatment and the situations are deemed comparable, 
levying taxes on outbound dividends may constitute a restriction of the fundamental 
freedoms.
310
 Equally in the case of inbound dividends, the Member State of residence of 
the shareholder may not subject the dividends distributed by non-resident companies to 
more disadvantageous treatment than to which the dividends distributed by resident 
companies are subjected by not granting same exemptions or options available in the latter 
cases.
311
 It may be asked whether those distributions to which the PSD provision has been 
applied are in a comparable situation to those distributions that have been made outside the 
scope of the Directive. It could be argued that these situations do not differ from normal 
distributions which could require the expansion of preferable domestic treatment. Falling 
outside the scope of the PSD, this is the manner how these distributions would have been 
treated in absence of the abusive arrangement, but it is unclear whether these distributions 
can be deemed to be comparable to the non-abusive situations.
312
  
4.1.2 Can Similar Benefits be Obtained from Other Bases? 
The aforementioned considerations lead to question whether the arrangements that have 
been denied the PSD benefits could gain access to similar benefits on different bases. It is 
possible that the Member States have either in their domestic tax legislation, as discussed 
above, or, more relevantly, in tax treaties granted benefits similar to those of the PSD. For 
example, in Denkavit it was required that the source state extended the withholding tax 
relief in domestic situations to non-residents.
313
 Nevertheless, the PSD provision does not 
explicitly require the Member States to deny other benefits in addition to those of the 
Directive. It has been concluded that this in combination with the Article 7(2) of the PSD, 
which states that the Directive does not affect other domestic or agreement-based provision 
that alleviate double taxation, could mean that the Member States are allowed to grant the 
benefits of other legislation even if the provision was applied.
314
 However, this Article 
deals with the imputation systems in the Member States which has been seen to mean that 
it should not have relevance in the situation at hand.
315
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It is, nevertheless, problematic with view to the effectiveness of the PSD anti-abuse 
provision if the benefits could be obtained in another way. It has been concluded that the 
principle of sincere cooperation and the effectiveness of the provision require its 
application also to tax treaties.
316
 It is, of course, possible that the Member States could 
deny the benefits of this other legislation by applying domestic or treaty-based anti-abuse 
provisions which are authorized by the Article 1(4) of the amending Directive 
2015/121/EU. If the arrangement was found to be abusive under the PSD provision, the 
same could happen, equally, when applying other anti-abuse provisions. Another question 
is whether the Member States are obliged to reach this conclusion based on the principle in 
the Article 4(3) of the TEU since it is accepted in the ECJ case law that the Member States 
are not obliged to combat abuse outside the scope of EU legislation as this belongs to the 
discretion of the Member States.
317
 The question is, essentially, whether the benefits in tax 
treaties could be considered to be benefits of the PSD and to come, therefore, within the 
scope of Union law which would require sincere cooperation.
318
 
In conclusion, the PSD provision leaves open many questions related to the exact 
composition of the benefits to be denied and how this should occur. Most importantly, 
should the provision require the simultaneous withdrawal of all of the benefits in the PSD 
or should the situations be considered separately, and, in addition, could the arrangements 
gain access to similar benefits through other bases. 
4.1.3 Which Taxpayers are Denied the Benefits? 
Since the PSD provision applies specifically to arrangements, it does not define further 
which parties should lose the benefits when the provision is applied. In the least complex 
scenario, there would be two companies: a parent company or a PE and a wholly owned 
subsidiary which could be both subjected to the provision depending on the interpretation 
whether both of the benefits in the PSD should be denied. It is, however, more complex to 
assess other scenarios which are equally possible in international groups. It can be, 
nevertheless, noted that it is the shareholder that is ultimately subjected to the provision 
since the withholding taxes mentioned in the PSD are taxes on the holders of shares.
319
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It is, for instance, possible that the subsidiary could have several shareholders which are 
entitled to the PSD benefits. If one of these relations was considered abusive, could this 
lead to withdrawal of benefits from all of the shareholders? The issue is not dealt with by 
the provision since it only requires that the ”arrangement” is denied the benefits, and the 
scope of the arrangement is not, as discussed above, limited to any specific elements. If 
several shareholders formed part of the arrangement, the benefits could, on the basis of the 
provision, be withdrawn from all of them. The definition of the arrangement gets more 
complicated if, for example, it would have been initiated by one shareholder alone or if 
several parties would have contributed to it at different stages.  
It is, however, a well-established part of the anti-abuse doctrine of the ECJ that anti-abuse 
provisions can lead to the loss of benefits only to the extent there has been abuse.
320
 In 
general, although the companies would form part of the same group, the benefits should, in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, be denied only to those companies that 
can be proved to have participated in the abusive arrangement.
321
 If one of the shareholders 
was a non-genuine conduit company, a reasonable conclusion would be to withdraw the 
benefits only with regard to this company which is supported also by the preamble of the 
amending Directive which proposes a ”to the extent approach.” 322  The extent of 
withdrawal depends on the fact which companies and shareholdings fall within the scope 
of the arrangement which may be occasionally complicated to establish. 
Further issues may arise in cases beyond the immediate parent-subsidiary relation when 
several companies in a row have profited from the benefits of the PSD due to the fact that 
the Directive requires the extension of the credit or the exemption to lower-tier subsidiaries 
fulfilling the necessary conditions.
323
 If, for instance, one of the companies in this kind of a 
structure was considered non-genuine, does this imply that only the distributions received 
by that company or also those made by the company, even to other companies outside the 
scope of the arrangement, should be denied the PSD benefits? This appears to depend, 
again, on the scope of the arrangement, and the distributions can be denied the benefits to 
the extent they originate from non-genuine subsidiaries or are otherwise non-genuine. The 
complexity of group structures means that it is not difficult envisage also other issues 
which could surface, but the provision itself does not contain any guidance in this respect.  
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4.1.4 The Obligation to Combat Abuse 
One of the most important characteristics of the PSD anti-abuse provision is its obligatory 
application. Since the Member States, ”shall not grant the benefits of this Directive,” there 
appears to arise an obligation to combat abuse in the situations that come within the scope 
of the new provision. The earlier PSD anti-abuse provision as well as those of other direct 
tax directives only authorized the usage of national anti-abuse rules.
324
 
Even earlier, there were comments that the principle of abuse of rights could entail an 
obligation for the Member States to combat abuse.
325
 The ECJ declared, however, in its 3M 
Italia case that within the field of non-harmonized direct taxation the Member States do 
not have an obligation to combat abuse.
326
 The judgment has been justified by the principle 
nature of the abuse of rights, which should not in itself limit the rights of the taxpayers, and 
by the case-by-case evaluation of abuse.
327
 There have been, however, opinions that an 
obligation to combat abuse could arise in such fields of law where the Member States have 
been subjected to harmonization measures and, as a consequence, have given a part of their 
sovereignty in combating abuse to the EU.
328
 In Halifax, for example, the ECJ required the 
Member States to redefine the transaction when it was found to be abusive.
329
 The PSD 
anti-abuse provision represents this situation and can be, therefore, seen to create an 
obligation to refuse the benefits of the Directive in certain situations. Here there is a 
contrast with the Merger Directive where the ECJ stated in Kofoed that without voluntary 
implementation of the anti-abuse rule in the Directive, the taxpayers could not be denied 
the rights on the basis of the provision.
330
 This kind of obligation raises, nevertheless, 
questions. First, how should this obligation be applied in practice? And second, what 
would be the consequences of non-compliance? 
The obligation requires the withdrawal of the benefits from the arrangement when the 
conditions of the provision are fulfilled. This may, however, not be as simple as it may 
appear. First, the PSD provision, as established above, contains an amount of uncertainty 
on its application. The conditions to be fulfilled are relatively vague and leave much 
discretion to the Member States. As a consequence, it is, in general, quite hard to indicate 
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in which situations the obligation to apply the provision should actually materialize. Does 
this obligation mean that the Member States should control all possibly abusive situations 
in order to determine whether the conditions have been fulfilled? This kind of 
comprehensive control of abusive practices has been seen, rightfully, as impractical since 
abuse may be hard to detect and is usually found only afterwards.
331
 Furthermore, this 
could raise issues with regard to the principle of proportionality since the ECJ has regarded 
as disproportionate such general anti-abuse rules that are not applied on a case-by-case 
basis which would be the case if all arrangements would be initially subjected to control.
332
 
Most of all, the Member States cannot anymore decide freely whether the abuse of PSD 
benefits should combated but they are, instead, obliged to do this. The aim of this 
obligation was, in the words of the Commission, to ensure a common standard in the 
application of the anti-abuse provision and to prevent directive-shopping through less-
stringent legislation in some Member States.
333
 The problem is, as evoked above, the fact 
that PSD arrangements involve several countries which could reach different conclusions 
on the abusiveness of the arrangement. On the one hand, some Member States could apply 
the PSD provision more broadly and deny the access to the benefits of the Directive for a 
wider range of arrangements while other Member States could be more lenient in this 
respect. If the Member States were to qualify an arrangement differently, which decision 
should prevail? Should a Member State be obliged to apply the provision if the other 
Member State had applied it? In this matter there have been different opinions while some 
have seen this to belong essentially to the decentralized nature of EU law, whereas others 
have considered that the Member States should adopt uniform conclusions.
334
 It has been 
concluded that the Member States should at least investigate the existence of abusive 
arrangements when so requested by other Member States.
335
 The question depends, equally, 
on the issue whether the benefits should be denied in the both countries or only in one of 
them since the latter conclusion would not lead to these problems. 
The Article 4(3) TEU on Member State loyalty could, however, have relevance in this 
respect since it requires the Member States to take relevant measures in order to achieve 
the aims of the Union legislation and not to initiate measures that may be detrimental to 
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these aims. In tax matters, this means that the Member States must not undermine the 
Union legislation by national decisions.
336
 With regard to the directives, the ECJ required 
already early that the Member States should implement all necessary measures in order to 
comply with the directives.
337
 In such situations where abuse would appear to be evident, 
such as wholly artificial arrangements, the other Member State could most probably be 
obliged to apply the anti-abuse provision if abuse had been established in another Member 
State since this could be required to achieve the aims of the Directive in the light of the 
Article 4(3) TEU. Nevertheless, in the large group of more uncertain situations and 
especially before the ECJ has given any guidance on the interpretation of the anti-abuse 
provision, this obligation may be somewhat harder to verify. What is more, in some 
situations the principle of loyalty could be actually seen to require the Member States to 
refrain from characterizing the arrangement as abusive if the conditions would not clearly 
have been fulfilled.  
The question on the consequences of non-compliance regarding the obligation to combat 
abuse may have, nevertheless, immediate relevance for the application of the provision. If 
a Member State does not comply with its European obligations, the Commission may bring 
the matter before the ECJ. According to the Articles 258-260 TFEU, the Court may impose 
a payment on the Member States that do not comply with their Treaty obligations. It has 
been stated, however, that the ECJ has not so far subjected Member States to such 
penalties in tax matters.
338
 It is equally possible that a Member State would be judged to 
pay compensation for private taxpayers if its actions breach the rights of the taxpayer and 
fulfill the conditions created by the ECJ for such compensation.
339
 This would entail 
repayment of illegally levied taxes.
340
 As a consequence, the Member States are in a 
somewhat challenging situation at least until further guidance has been given on the 
interpretation of the PSD provision. On the one hand, they must apply the provision to 
combat abuse, but if they were to apply the provision too broadly, these actions could be 
deemed to be not in accordance with the EU law. On the other hand, if they were to combat 
abuse too leniently, the Member States could risk the possibility of infringement 
procedures. 
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4.2 National Implementation of the Anti-Abuse Provision  
4.2.1 The Way of Implementation 
The PSD anti-abuse provision creates, in the words of the amending Directive, a minimum 
anti-abuse rule.
341
 Article 288 TFEU stipulates that the directives are binding only with 
regard to their objectives but the Member States are free to choose the form of 
implementation. It should be noted that the Article 115 TFEU, which is used to enact 
legislation within the Direct tax area, makes possible only the approximation of national 
laws, not complete harmonization. If the legislation was to be completely harmonized, the 
Member States implementation measures would be tested only against the directive while 
in other situations the Member State legislation is examined in the light of both primary 
and secondary law.
342
It should be examined, first, how the Member States should 
implement the provision and, second, what is their discretion to adopt different solutions.  
First, the ECJ stated already in an early phase that the directives in general cannot create 
obligations to individuals if they have not been properly transposed into national 
legislation.
343
 Furthermore, given the fact that anti-abuse provisions instead of granting 
rights to individuals aim to deny certain rights, the anti-abuse provisions in the direct tax 
directives, as established in Kofoed, do not have direct effect which would allow the 
Member States to apply them without national implementation.
344
 What leaves, however, 
considerable latitude to the Member States is that they are free to decide on the way of 
implementation. This implies that all the Member States are not necessarily required to 
actually enact new legislation or legislate with the same expressions if their national 
legislation already fulfills the legislative purpose of the directive and enables the taxpayers 
to find the extent of their rights and obligations.
345
 Whatever the form of legislation would 
be, it should be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the directive and, more generally, 
according to the European legal order in general.
346
  
It may be, therefore, considered how the PSD provision should be enacted in the national 
legislation. The provision itself is quite broadly and vaguely formulated which means that 
in some cases the national anti-abuse provisions as such could already constitute sufficient 
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implementation. On the other hand, this may constitute a problem since the Member States 
cannot be completely certain which level of abuse the provisions actually requires and 
whether it marks a departure from the previous doctrine of the ECJ. It has been concluded 
that the Member States should, in order to guard the effectiveness of the provision, take it 
as a part of the national legislation.
347
 This conclusion could be supported by the fact that 
the provision strives to improve consistency of Member State anti-abuse measures which 
could be jeopardized if the Member State legislation would not have a similar content.
348
 
The most essential part of the provision, the obligation to prevent abuse, should in any case 
be expressed in the national legislation. 
Of further relevance are the opportunities that the Member States have in enacting different 
provisions which is explicitly allowed by the Directive. In cases of minimum 
harmonization, the Member States have the competence to enact stricter provisions within 
the boundaries of the Treaties.
349
 Since the PSD provision forms the minimum level which 
the Member States have to implement in any case, they cannot apply more lenient 
provisions, but more stringent provisions should be, at least prima facie, possible. All 
Member State rules implementing the Directive should, nevertheless, respect the principle 
of proportionality and the limits created by the fundamental freedoms.
350
 There have been 
different opinions on how far the Member States could actually go in creating different 
solutions. On the one hand, it has been considered that such provision are possible, but 
they could possibly lead to infringement of fundamental freedoms.
351
 On the other hand, it 
has been seen that fundamental freedoms could prevent the application of any more 
stringent anti-abuse provisions.
352
 It has been even concluded that the provision leads to 
full harmonization which prevents all exercise of Member State discretion.
353
  
The question is, therefore, how the Member States could actually depart from the standard 
created in the PSD provision. First, it could be possible to apply the provision to a larger 
number of benefits than that come within the scope of the PSD. This should not, however, 
pose any serious complications since these cases would most likely concern either national 
law or tax treaties where combating abuse as such remain at the discretion of the Member 
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States. In these cases, the question would be more of an issue of domestic law which 
should, should a relevant link exist, conform to the ECJ case law. More issues arise if the 
Member States enacted a provision that would use a lower limit to establish the abusive 
nature of the arrangement. If the provision itself was interpreted to involve a broader 
standard than the one that has been present in the ECJ case law, it would be more than 
difficult to argue that an even broader provision could be proportionate. Regarding the 
situation where the provision is interpreted in the light of the established ECJ doctrine, 
wider application would face the limits of the fundamental freedoms, and it is doubtful 
whether even this kind of deviation from the ECJ case law would be accepted if the Court 
does not change its doctrine. In conclusion, the possibility to enact stricter provision may 
be rather limited although explicitly allowed. The Member States may, of course, continue 
to apply stricter anti-abuse rules to other benefits outside the scope of the PSD. Given these 
considerations, concrete Member State implementing measures should be examined.   
4.2.2 Legislative Choices in the Member States 
The examination is commenced in Finland where the PSD provision was implemented in 
the new paragraph 6a § of the Business Income Tax Act (Laki elinkeinotulon 
verottamisesta) which is in all relevant aspects identical to the provision enacted by the 
Council.
354
 The way of implementation was decided by consistency with the proposed 
provision, and although the Finnish tax legislation contains already a common anti-abuse 
provision, the provision was considered to be justified.
355
 It is interesting to note that since 
the 6a § concerns not only distributions within the scope of the PSD but also such 
distribution in EEA-countries which fulfill similar requirements as well as national 
distributions, the exception created by the anti-abuse provision encompasses a wider range 
of distributions than required by the provision. In specialist opinions, it was feared that the 
provision could be applied randomly, given its unclear wording, and that it was too broad 
and should be applied according to the sole purpose or predominant purpose test used 
elsewhere in the domestic legislation.
356
 The Finance Committee responded by underlining 
the application of the provision in the light of the purpose of the Directive and the 
possibility to apply the provision only to a part of the arrangement.
357
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In Sweden, on the contrary, the anti-abuse provision was enacted by relatively restricted 
modifications of the national legislation. The legislation in force contained a common anti-
abuse rule, which was considered to cover the inbound situations in a way comparable to 
the PSD provision, although the scope of the national rule was wider which was, however, 
considered to be allowed by the new provision.
358
 With regard to the outbound 
distributions, the law in question (Kupongskattelag), which contains a further anti-abuse 
provision, was not considered to fully cover these distributions, and the national provision 
was regarded to contain some issues with regard to its applicability in the PSD 
situations.
359
 The legislation was, therefore, changed only with regard to the latter rule 
whose scope of application was clarified to encompass also the relevant abusive situations, 
but no new anti-abuse clause was actually implemented.
360
 Initially, there was an intention 
to widen the scope of the general anti-avoidance rule, but the proposition was changed 
after widespread criticism.
361
There were, furthermore, concerns that the PSD provision 
was not in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
362
 
In the Netherlands, the PSD provision was implemented in Article 17 of the Wet op de 
vennootschapsbelasting and in the Article 1 of the Wet op de dividenbelasting.
363
  The 
implemented provisions correspond with certain modifications to the wording of the 
amending Directive. Interestingly, the legislator discussed the amount of required 
substance which could constitute valid commercial reasons, and the fact that a company 
did not in itself have commercial activities was not found to constitute a non-genuine 
arrangement if the company functioned as a link within a group.
364
 The approach chosen 
was a worldwide approach which is applied equally to EU as well as to non-EU 
companies.
365
 The possible broader scope of application of the new provision in 
comparison with the ECJ case law was questioned although the government noted the 
opinion of the Commission where the provision was considered to be in line with the 
primary law and that the change in wording should not lead to a change in the national 
practice.
366
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A similar way of transformation according to the wording of the proposed provision was 
adopted also in other Member States. In Denmark, the provision was implemented with a 
similar wording but, remarkably, the scope of application was widened to encompass also 
the Merger Directive and the Interest Royalty Directive.
367
 In Portugal, the provision was 
implemented in a form nearly identical to that of the amending Directive although 
requiring that the arrangement defeats the purpose of, ”elimination of double taxation.”368 
In France, an identical provision was implemented to replace a former anti-abuse provision 
applicable in PSD situations.
369
 
Of the six Member States analyzed, five had decided to implement the PSD anti-abuse 
provision as such or with minor modifications. This may confirm the issues that the open 
and broad nature of the provision has for diverging domestic rules. When the application of 
the provision is uncertain, it is more difficult to create different solutions since they could 
create the risk of breaching the intended objectives of the proposed provision if the 
domestic rules were not applied similarly and as broadly as was intended. Consequently, 
the new provision which aims to function as a minimum rule may, as concluded by some 
commentators, actually turn into a baseline from which the Member States do not dare to 
depart.
370
 There seems to exist doubts, whether the provision, as discussed above, departs 
from the established ECJ case law or whether it should be interpreted according to it. As a 
consequence, this has an evident effect on legal certainty before the ECJ has ruled on the 
application of the provision which may take several years. Before that, the Member States 
will face a severe challenge in trying to find the mode and scope of application that is not 
only in line with the ECJ case law but also with the objectives of the new provision. 
4.3 Application of Other Anti-Abuse Provisions 
A further question is how other domestic anti-abuse provisions are affected by the new 
provision. The Article 1(4) of the provision authorizes the Member States to 
apply, ”domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of tax evasion, 
tax fraud or abuse.” This is emphasized also in the recitals of the amending Directive 
where it is stated that: ”This Directive should not affect in any way Member States' ability 
to apply their domestic or agreement-based provisions aimed at preventing tax evasion, tax 
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fraud or abuse.”371 This authorization raises two different questions. First, what measures 
are actually allowed by the provision? And second, how does the existence of the PSD 
provision affect these measures? The former anti-abuse provision of the PSD contained 
similar language although only fraud and abuse where stated. It must be assumed that since 
the new provision deals with the abuse of the Directive, the authorization concerns rules 
applicable to other situations. 
It must be, therefore, considered what is meant with the concepts tax evasion, tax fraud and 
abuse. First, tax evasion is regarded as an illegal way to avoid taxation by withholding 
required information.
372
 Interestingly, the French version of the amending Directive differs 
by authorizing measures against tax evasion (fraude fiscal) and abuse (abus) without 
mentioning tax fraud. The tax fraud indicates in some countries a specific form of tax 
evasion.
373
 It has been seen to signify a behavior where, similarly or identically to tax 
evasion, certain information has been concealed.
374
 Abuse, in its turn, has been defined as 
the use of artificial constructions in order to exploit the benefits granted by the tax 
legislation.
375
 The word ”required” has been seen to implicate in the context of the former 
PSD anti-abuse provision a higher level of necessity for the existence of these rules.
376
 
Despite the conceptual difficulties, rules preventing tax evasion, which is regarded as 
criminalized conduct, should not most probably pose problems regarding the PSD 
provision since the application of these rules and their consequences is based on different 
premises.  
With regard to the rules preventing abuse, the authorized measures could either coincide 
with the new provision or cover different situations. Given the way of minimum 
harmonization and obligatory application, the Member States must, however, apply in the 
scope of the PSD a provision that is at least as strict as the proposed provision.
377
 If the 
Member States have applied other national provisions to combat abuse of the PSD, they 
are, effectively, displaced by the new provision to the extent they do not comply to the 
standard of the provision.
378
 On the other hand, any stricter anti-abuse provisions face the 
restrictive effect of the fundamental freedoms, and the implementation of the PSD 
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provision may leave, as discussed above, little space to create different domestic rules 
within its scope. This can, actually, lead in the case of some Member States to an 
obligation to lower the standards of the former anti-abuse provisions, when applied to the 
PSD benefits, if they do not represent a similar level of evaluation.
379
 More dramatic 
effects could arise if the new provision is seen to require the denial of benefits arising also 
from other bases. 
In the case of other national provisions, the effects are depended on the scope of the 
provisions in question. If they apply only to situations where the PSD does not apply, for 
instance to purely domestic situations, the new provision may not produce any apparent 
consequences. Possible interference could arise in such circumstances where the abusive 
arrangements contain several, relevant steps to which multiple anti-abuse rules could be 
applicable. There could be, for example, a domestic restructuration which was conducted 
in order to attain abusively a tax advantage and which was followed by abuse of the PSD 
benefits. If there is no overlap between the benefits of these national provisions applicable 
to the restructuration and those of the PSD, the new provision should not affect the 
application of different anti-abuse provisions to the restructuration itself. Of great 
relevance is, nevertheless, the question whether the PSD provision with the principle of 
loyalty could require the denial of equivalent benefits which could in certain situations lead 
to the displacement of national anti-abuse rules also outside the scope of the PSD.   
Furthermore, it is possible that the new provision would affect the application of other 
supranational anti-abuse rules. The first group is, evidently, other European anti-abuse 
rules in the tax directives but they should not, due to their different scope, coincide with 
the application of the PSD anti-abuse provision. Regarding the other provisions of the PSD 
itself which can be used to prevent abusive situations, such as the Article 3(2) minimum 
holding period, the ECJ has considered that the general anti-abuse provision cannot be 
applied when the situation falls within the scope of such special provisions.
380
 The same 
applies most probably to the new anti-hybrid rule.
381
 Although the rule leads to some 
extent to the same results as the general anti-abuse provision by requiring the taxation of 
distributed profits in the state of the parent company, it is applied differently and it does 
not require that there is actually abuse but only the existence of a deduction in the state of 
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the subsidiary which does not, most probably, form a relevant element in assessing the 
abuse on the basis of the general anti-abuse provision. More interesting situations can arise 
with regard to a similarly worded general anti-abuse rule proposed by the Commission as a 
part of a new directive against tax avoidance in the EU.
382
 
In conclusion, the Member States are even after the implementation of the new anti-abuse 
provision allowed to apply other domestic provisions that are used to combat different kind 
of abuse. If these rules apply also to the benefits of the PSD, their application is excluded 
unless they comply with the standard of the provision. In the cases where multiple anti-
abuse rules could be applied to deny the same benefits, it is most probably of no relevance 
which of them is actually applied as long as the abuse is denied based on the, arguably 
broad, conditions of the PSD provision.  
4.4 The PSD Anti-Abuse Provision and the EU Primary Law 
4.4.1 Does the Provision Create a Restriction on the Fundamental Freedoms? 
Being secondary legislation, the PSD must be applied according to the primary law of the 
Union.
383
 Here, at least two distinct issues can be detected. First, the PSD anti-abuse 
provision could in itself be considered not to be in accordance with the primary law.
384
 
Second, the application of the domestic legislation enacted on the basis of the provision 
can be constrained by the fundamental freedoms especially in such cases where the 
national legislation is more restrictive than the Directive.
385
 In the first case, the whole 
provision could be considered to breach the primary law of the EU and be found invalid 
according to the Article 263 TFEU. In the second case, the question is whether the 
fundamental freedoms could be restricted by the application of the provision in the 
Member States, and how the Treaty could, consequently, limit the scope of the provision. 
The question arises both with regard to the application of the provision in its proposed 
form as well as in situations where the Member States have departed from it. 
First, it can be considered how the fundamental freedoms can be breached. The case at 
hand does not deal with a traditional discriminatory tax measure enacted by the Member 
States but with harmonized legislation with an explicit obligation to combat abuse, but this 
remains, like all EU measures, under the scope of the Treaty prohibition of 
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discrimination.
386
 Directives that do not respect this can be examined against the 
fundamental freedoms.
387
 The TFEU prohibits differential treatment in situations which 
can be considered to be comparable.
388
 Discrimination can be either direct, when it is based 
on nationality, or indirect, when it is based on other factors but in reality has effects on the 
nationals of other Member States.
389
 The ECJ has, furthermore, both in tax and non-tax 
cases created the notion of restriction i.e., if the national measure forms an obstacle to the 
exercise of the freedom of movement, although not directly making difference between 
nationals of different Member States, the measure is considered to be against the EU 
primary law.
390
 The Court has, however, turned later back to a more discrimination-based 
approach even though certain inconsistencies remain in this doctrine.
391
  
Second, it has to be considered whether the PSD provision either discriminates or is non-
discriminatory. The comparison between the nationals of one Member State and non-
residents is an essential step in establishing whether there is discrimination.
392
 The ECJ has 
found PEs to be comparable to the companies of the same Member State.
393
 The same has 
been found in relation to such distributions by resident companies to non-resident 
shareholders which are subjected to taxation in the state of source.
394
 Equally regarding 
double taxation relief on inbound dividends, these dividends have been found to be 
comparable to dividends paid by resident companies.
395
 In the case at hand, the 
distributions under the PSD appear, therefore, to be comparable to domestic distributions 
between subsidiaries and parent companies.  
The ECJ has found a restriction in several cases with regard to such Member State anti-
abuse provisions which are applied essentially to cross-border situations.
396
 The Court has 
found even such provisions, comparable to the PSD provision, which do not automatically 
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prevent certain transactions but which create this possibility to be restrictive.
397
 The PSD 
provision creates a risk of exclusion which targets solely cross-border situations and which 
may prevent companies in Member States from establishing or investing in other Member 
States. The restriction appears in two relations. First, between a parent company that has 
subsidiaries or PEs abroad and a one that has not and, second, between a subsidiary or a PE 
having international parents and on that has its parent company in the same country.
398
 The 
restriction can affect the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital 
depending on the exact scope of the shareholding.
399
 Regarding the latter, the scope of the 
freedom may rise the issue also in third-country situations although there may be more 
discretion in this respect.
400
 Even the existence of rules applicable to domestic situations 
may not change the conclusion since the ECJ has also found such rules that apply without 
distinction to both domestic and cross-border situations to be restrictive.
401
  
It some situations, however, the rules may be reasonably applicable only to cross-border 
situations since similar domestic situations do not exist.
402
 The PSD provision denies 
access to benefits that are only required to be available in cross-border distributions. The 
Directive's function is, essentially, to reinforce the fundamental freedoms, and it goes 
further in its relief of cross-border double taxation than the freedoms go which means that 
the distributions outside its scope are not discriminated since they benefit from the 
fundamental freedoms.
403
 This could allow to argue that the restrictions of the Directive 
cannot be compared with domestic situations. Nevertheless, the PSD is, alongside the other 
direct tax directives, the primary way to alleviate double taxation within the Union and 
with the aim to make cross-border situations comparable to domestic ones.
404
 Many 
domestic situations may benefit from similar double taxation relief, and there does not 
appear to arise reasons why the situations could not be considered to be comparable. It is, 
furthermore, possible to find a restriction if the provision is applied so broadly that it 
restricts the fundamental freedoms more than the ECJ has considered acceptable.  
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It is, nevertheless, important to consider whether the existence of the anti-abuse provision 
itself is the source of issues. The measures enacted by the EU can be justified on same 
conditions as the Member State measures but the Union has, to some extent, even more 
discretion in this respect.
405
 In Gebhard, the Court required that national measures had to 
be non-discriminatory, justified, suitable to attain their aim, and proportional.
406
 All the 
direct tax directives have already had, although non-obligatory, anti-abuse clauses, and the 
ECJ has not, at least to the date, found them in itself to lead to restriction of the freedom of 
movement even though the national legislation implementing these clauses has been 
occasionally found to be restrictive.
407
 Combating tax abuse has been accepted by the ECJ 
as a legitimate reason to restrict the fundamental freedoms although it is subjected to 
several conditions.
408
 Therefore, the Court has accepted that the application of anti-abuse 
clauses in a directive as such does not constitute an unjustifiable breach of the fundamental 
freedoms or discrimination although they are, inherently, applied only to cross-border 
situations. Taken this together, it appears that, regarding the PSD provision, the restriction 
of the fundamental freedoms is tied to the suitability and proportionality of the provision 
and not to its application as such.
409
  
It is here where the issues of the new provision can surface. As discussed above, the 
wording of the provision, which requires that one of main purposes of the arrangement is a 
tax advantage as well as the lack of reference to wholly artificial arrangements, may lead to 
conclusion that the level of required artificiality is lower than required by the ECJ in its 
consistent case law. The Court has in many occasions and consistently required that the 
anti-abuse rules must counter only wholly artificial arrangements.
410
 Although with regard 
to the Merger Directive the Court has not explicitly required this, it is most probably 
caused by the different formulation of the respective provision, and even here the ECJ has 
made reference to solely abusive transactions.
411
 If the PSD provision is applied according 
to its wording, it can lead to exclusion of such arrangement which have not been 
considered to be abusive by the ECJ and which have some relevant commercial content 
and, consequently, lead to restriction of the freedom of movement. The provision could 
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make it less advantageous to group companies within the EU if the groups in question 
could be considered as abusive in the context of the PSD even if this was not the case 
outside the scope of the Directive. 
Nonetheless, this effect is created only if the provision is actually interpreted more broadly 
both by the Member States and by the ECJ. The provision is vaguely worded, and the lack 
of further guidance does not allow to make definite conclusions on its application. Given 
the possible broad implications of the provision on the effectiveness of the PSD, it should 
be, as discussed above, interpreted in accordance with the Directive and the ECJ case law 
as a whole. This is the way in which the Court consistently avoids apparent collisions of 
secondary and primary law.
412
 A similar subjective test has been approved as such in the 
case of the Merger Directive, and the economic reality test, although not mentioning 
wholly artificial arrangements, can be interpreted to require a high level of artificiality 
which is defended both by practical considerations and the consistent ECJ case law. Even 
the Commission emphasized the compatibility of the provision with the Court's doctrine. It 
is, therefore, more than possible that the ECJ could interpret also the new provision in the 
light of its previous case law which would remove the apparent risk of restriction on the 
freedom of movement. Since the provision does not include any definite rules that would 
exclude certain situations outright, interpreting the provision in conformance with the ECJ 
case law should not be manifestly impossible.  
4.4.2 Is the Provision Consistent with the Principle of Subsidiarity? 
Nevertheless, there is a chance that the PSD provision could raise problems with regard to 
the principle of subsidiarity since in such areas where the EU does not have exclusive 
competence, its actions may not go further than necessary, and they can go only so far as 
some aim is better achieved at the level of the Union.
413
 According to Articles 263-264 
TFEU, the ECJ has a possibility to declare secondary legislation void if the legislation 
infringes the Treaties or procedural requirements in its implementation.
414
 In general, the 
ECJ does not easily find grounds to declare secondary legislation void, but it rather arrives 
to a Treaty-conformant interpretation and, furthermore, the Union has a somewhat broader 
discretion to enact restrictive measures in comparison with the Member States.
415
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As direct taxation has not been mentioned in the Treaties, the complete harmonization of 
tax rules cannot be achieved within the competences conferred to the Union.
416
 For 
example in Sweden, there were comments that the PSD provision would go further than 
necessary with regard to the principle of subsidiarity since anti-abuse rules are best enacted 
nationally and adapted to national conditions.
417
 The Commission, on the contrary, 
considered the provision to be necessary exactly because the national anti-abuse rules 
contained such variance that allegedly made individual actions by the Member States 
ineffective.
418
 The question revolves around the limits on harmonization by the Article 115 
TFEU, and it appears that the biggest issue is the obligatory, minimum-level nature of the 
new anti-abuse rule. 
The Article 115 authorizes such approximation of law which, ”directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market.” This has been considered as a mean to 
remove either restrictions on the fundamental freedoms or distortions of competition.
419
 
With regard to the first, the PSD provision seems to rather possibly restrict the 
fundamental freedoms than to remove such restrictions which is, essentially, the purpose of 
the PSD. If the application of the provision was, however, voluntary, it could lead to 
exactly those problems the Commission described, namely, the exploit of legislation in 
such Member States which do not have anti-abuse provisions. Furthermore, it has been 
considered that the ECJ could actually interfere with the harmonization measures on the 
basis of the principle of subsidiarity only in such cases where the breach would be apparent, 
and that the unanimity requirement would serve as a proof of conformance with the 
principle.
420
 Although further discussion is not possible, it appears that there could be 
grounds to maintain the PSD provision also with regard to the principle of subsidiarity.  
4.4.3 Does Application of the Provision in the Member States Create a Restriction? 
Such as the PSD provision itself, the Member State implementation legislation can lead to 
restriction of the fundamental freedoms. The effects of the provision are, in any case, 
visible essentially when the Member States actually apply it. In situations where the 
Member States are applying the implemented provision, two issues can surface. If the 
provision has been enacted  identically or close to the proposed provision, it is possible that 
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it is applied more broadly than originally intended. In the second situation, the Member 
States may have created stricter anti-abuse rules or their national legislation may already 
contain such rules. In the cases of minimum harmonization such as the PSD provision, the 
Member States measures are tested both against the directive as well as the primary law.
421
 
The ECJ has concluded that the Member States may exercise their options granted by the 
directives only in accordance with the fundamental freedoms.
422
 From this it can be clearly 
seen that any Member State anti-abuse provisions which go further than the proposed 
provision must be implemented and applied in accordance with the fundamental freedoms. 
The first scenario evoked above is related to the unclear interpretation of the PSD 
provision which is set to persist until the ECJ rules on the issue or the EU issues other 
guidance. It is possible that the Member States apply the provision more broadly than has 
been allowed by the ECJ in its case law on national anti-abuse rules and, should the ECJ 
keeps its standard, the Member States measures could be found to breach the fundamental 
freedoms. The question in this case is, however, one of the correct interpretation and does 
not have effects on the implemented legislation as it follows the letter of the amending 
Directive.  
The second scenario involves similar conclusions. As stated above, it is hard to see how 
the Member States could actually depart from the enacted provision since it itself seems to 
go further than the ECJ has gone if the provision is not interpreted in a way compatible 
with the PSD and the ECJ case law. There is, therefore, a real risk that stricter Member 
State provisions could breach the fundamental freedoms. In such cases, these provision 
would be replaced by the conformant ECJ interpretation to the extent the provision is not 
in conformance with the freedoms.
423
 It has been considered that the Member States can 
continue to apply the provisions in those situations where the restriction does not 
materialize.
424
 The anti-abuse rules could, therefore, be applied to domestic situations and, 
if their scope was limited by national courts, to cross-border distributions. 
5 Conclusions  
In the preceding chapters, the new anti-abuse provision of the PSD has been analyzed with 
regard to its possible interpretations and its effects as a part of the European direct tax 
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legislation. The most evident conclusion is uncertainty i.e., how is the provision actually 
meant to be applied and how will it in practice affect cross-border corporate taxation in the 
Member States. Although the ECJ has created an ever-broadening field of case law related 
to direct taxation and defined in several judgments the boundaries of abuse within this area 
of tax law, it has issued, to date, relatively few judgments concerning the anti-abuse 
provisions in the direct tax directives. Since the PSD anti-abuse provision is without 
precedent both with regard to its detailed wording and its obligatory application, it can be 
expected with certainty that the Court will have to rule on the exact boundaries of the 
provision in the following years. 
The first research question on the interpretation of the provision can lead to different 
conclusions. Most interestingly, the provision omits any reference to the 
established ”wholly artificial arrangements” concept although it is formulated somewhat 
similarly in comparison with the Court's definition in the landmark Cadbury Schweppes 
case. If read literally, the wording of the provision can appear to define abuse in the 
context of the PSD more broadly than has been accepted in the established case law. 
Whether the Council purposively intended to enact a provision that would give the 
Member States more latitude in combating abuse or whether it just used a different 
wording to tell the same the ECJ has done in several occasions, appears somewhat unclear. 
The provision is, nevertheless, open to various interpretations, and the brief survey of the 
implementation measures in the Member States appears to confirm the uncertainty on the 
exact boundaries of the provision.  
If the provision is, however, given an interpretation that is based on the ECJ case law and 
which takes into account the purpose of the PSD and the fundamental freedoms, it can be 
regarded to require mainly tax-motivated arrangements that reflect high level of 
artificiality with regard to their content. Whether these arrangements should be 
characterized as wholly artificial arrangements, depends on the suitability of the main 
purpose test in this context although the exact level of required tax motivation appears to 
be one of the most uncertain questions in the ECJ case law on tax abuse. The arrangements 
may contain certain lesser commercial aims, but these should be secondary to the tax 
motives. The provisions applies principally to such situations where a company, either in a 
Member State or, perhaps more relevantly, in a third-country, initiates the arrangement 
with the purpose of obtaining the benefits of the Directive if it would not be, without the 
arrangement, entitled to them. This is how the purpose of the Directive is contravened. In 
 75 
   
addition to this, the arrangement must have elements that show its lack of economic reality, 
and this may be, actually, the most important step in the application of the provision. As 
discussed more extensively above, the substance requirement in Cadbury Schweppes may 
not always function as a reliable indicator of economic reality in international group 
structures, and this evaluation needs, consequently, also other factors. At any rate, the 
interpretation of the provision should avoid compromising the effectiveness of the PSD. 
With regard to the second research question on the effects of the provision, most 
significance can be attributed to its compulsory, minimum-nature and the possible conflicts 
with the national legislation. The Member States are, effectively, precluded from applying 
other national anti-abuse provisions within the scope of the new provision. This entails, 
essentially, a displacement of competence from the Member States towards the ECJ. The 
effect is strengthened if the provision is seen to require the withdrawal of other, similar 
benefits arising from the tax treaties and other tax legislation which, alongside the exact 
scope of denial of the benefits of the PSD, depends on the actual interpretation of the 
provision. Most saliently, from now on the Member States are obliged to combat abuse of 
tax law in the field of direct taxation, and the way how this obligation is to be fulfilled may 
contain some friction. It is also questionable whether the Member States have in reality any 
discretion to enact different national solutions since they, inevitably, risk the breach of the 
fundamental freedoms which means that the authorization in the provisions to this end may 
prove to be illusory.  
In the end, it can be returned to the two ideas presented in the introduction i.e., does the 
provision restrict the freedom of movement in the Internal Market, and is it effective in 
combating abuse? First, the provision is, in itself, liable to create additional burden on 
cross-border distributions within the scope of the PSD. Whether this restricts fundamental 
freedoms is a matter of interpretation. If the provision is interpreted according to the 
established case law, it cannot be necessarily considered to create unjustifiable burden on 
these freedoms. The Member States have been, after all, authorized to apply such measures 
even before. Whether the PSD would have actually needed such a provision is, of course, 
subject to another discussion, and even the interpretation adopted may create uncertainty 
amongst the taxpayers. More relevant is the possible impact of the provision on the 
functioning of the PSD itself. 
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Since the scope of this research does not include an evaluation of the most effective anti-
abuse measures, the effectiveness of the provision must be seen, essentially, with regard to 
its objectives i.e., the need to combat abuse in all Member States and consistency of these 
measures. It may be seen to success in creating an unified system where all the Member 
States must combat abusive arrangements which means that these arrangements cannot be 
effected through the Member States with the weakest anti-abuse legislation. Regarding the 
consistency, the effectiveness of this approach can be questioned. The vagueness of the 
provision and the lack of guidance mean that the Member States are set to reach varying 
conclusions before the scope of the provision has been clarified. The uncertainty this 
creates for the taxpayers and for the tax administrations would have supported a more 
narrowly-defined provision that could have countered the abusive arrangements deemed 
most harmful.  
In the end, the problems discussed should be kept in mind when new anti-abuse measures 
are designed in the EU. The PSD provision will function as a test case for a new approach 
in the field of European tax law. If the experiences proves to be negative or even counter-
productive, it may discourage the European legislator from creating similar provisions in 
the future. On the other hand, the true significance of the PSD provision may become 
clearer only after several years if the time required by the national processes and the 
subsequent ECJ deliberation is taken into account. During this time, it would be 
recommendable that the Commission would publish guidance on the application of the 
provision.  
If the provision is interpreted according to the established case law, it may turn out to be a 
relatively small amendment that does not radically change the landscape of European tax 
law. On the other hand, there is a risk that its interpretation creates such uncertainty and 
issues that will make the Member States, the ultimate decision-makers in the field of 
taxation, think twice before embarking to harmonize legislation in this manner. The 
experience will be relevant also when the Member States contemplate whether abuse 
should be best combated on the level of the EU or nationally. Most of all, it is 
recommended that any new initiatives with the aim of combating tax abuse should either 
contain more detailed clarifications or be worded with regard to established case law. 
 
